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EdiTOriAL
In her reflection on the roundtable with women ex-prisoners 
that brought to a close the Institute of Women’s Studies second 
annual conference (March 23-25 2010), Rema Hammami 
points out not only their courage in resisting humiliation and 
mistreatment in prison, but the dilemmas they face – including 
isolation and censure – as they attempt to build their lives and 
futures after prison. It is an important reminder that violence can 
also be embedded in social indifference or failure to understand 
and learn from the experience of those who have been subjected 
to colonial or other forms of violence.
The Institute’s conference was an attempt to break this 
isolation in practice and in analysis – to connect, understand 
and address the operations of violence in its many aspects 
through an exploration of the conference theme, “Formations of 
Violence in Palestinian Reality: Colonialism, Power Structures 
and Gender Relations.” As Talal Asad reminds us (quoted by 
Johnson in this volume), external and internal violence are 
not separate categories but there is a “historical space in which 
violence circulates.” That space in our context is clearly colonial. 
Conference organizers thus aimed for an integrated approach 
where colonial violence, national violence and domestic violence 
could be brought together, while not ignoring their specificities.
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Keynote addresses by Stefania Pandolfo, Associate Professor of Anthropology at 
the University of California at Berkeley, and Dubravka Zarkov, Associate Professor 
at the Institute for Social Studies in the Hague (Netherlands), took us beyond the 
bounds of Palestine and brought us back again with new conceptual approaches 
to, and questions about, gender and violent conflict, in the case of Zarkov, and 
destruction and trauma, in the work of Pandolfo. Pandolfo returned to a key text 
of Frantz Fanon to look at such trauma among Moroccan youths and Zarkov 
presented an exposition of feminist conceptualizations of war as they developed 
over time, in different locations (whether the west or the global south), and within 
various forms of war and conflict. 
Other papers published here in the English section include Aitemad Muhanna’s 
important exploration of how husbands and wives in poor and vulnerable 
households in Gaza respond to the violence around them, particularly the effects of 
the Israeli siege, and how family and gender dynamics are affected. In “Reporting 
Gaza,” two presentations of household surveys conducted after Israel’s war in Gaza 
show the sustained and gendered consequences of colonial conflict and siege on 
Gazan families. Rita Giacaman of Birzeit’s Institute of Community and Public 
Health (ICPH) presented “Humanitarian Crisis and Social Suffering in the Gaza 
Strip: An Initial Comparison Between Women and Men,” using findings from 
ICPH’s summer 2010 survey, while Rema Hammami of the Institute of Women’s 
Studies presented and analyzed voices of women, men and young people from 
focus groups conducted in the context of a UNIFEM/ UN Gender Task Force 
Household Survey in March 2009. Also in this section, Penny Johnson looked 
at the “paradox of Palestinian civil policing” when the Israeli occupation does 
not acknowledge civilians and where such policing is embedded in larger security 
structures. 
In keeping with its commitment to publish graduate student research and 
writing – and in keeping with the focus on violence in this issue of the Review 
– we are pleased to publish excerpts from Benaz Somiry-Batrawi’s master thesis 
which examine audience reception of both Palestinian women and men to a 2008 
documentary film on “honor” crimes.
The majority of papers by Palestinian academics, researchers and NGO 
activists exploring the multiple effects of violence are found in the Arabic section 
of the Review. Islah Jad opened a window to a subject that is all too frequently 
treated only with sensational cliches in the Western press in her empirically 
rich exposition on “Women of the Hamas Movement and Positions towards 
Martyrdom Operation by Women.” Jad is one of the few researchers to conduct 
sustained research on women in Islamic movements in Palestine. 
Although critical in both significance and size, both Jerusalem and Gaza 
have often been marginalized in local research and policy initiatives in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, and the experiences and analysis of Palestinian 
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women living inside the green line are often not heard by those of us on the 
other side. A number of speakers gave conference participants an opportunity 
to hear these voices, some of whom are published here. Among them, Sama’ 
Aweidah of the Jerusalem-based Women’s Studies Center offered a vivid portrayal 
of “The Israeli Occupation and its Effects on Palestinian Women in Jerusalem.” 
Depite the much regretted absence of researchers living in Gaza, the conference 
also managed to provide a focus on Gaza and the multiple effects of violence, 
particularly Israeli siege, sanctions and war, on men, women and children there. 
Aside from the presentations in English noted above, Hadeel Qazaaz, on behalf 
of the Women’s Affairs Center (a key women’s NGO in Gaza), provided the 
voices of Gazan women in her presentation, “Women of Gaza: Teach Us Some 
of What You Have.” As the title indicates, Qazaaz focuses on the agency and 
capabilities of Gazan women as they struggle against almost impossible odds, 
rather than casting them solely as victims. Providing yet another key perspective, 
Himmat Zu’bi from Mada Al-Carmel, a Palestinian research center based in 
Haifa, analyzed “Economic Violence Against Palestinian Women in the 1948 
Areas: a Case Study of Displaced Women from Saffuriya.” 
Fatena Wazzaefi from the Palestinian Ministry of Women’s Affairs shared 
with the conference the Ministry’s view in “The Palestinian National Plan to 
Combat Violence and the Palestinian Authority,” opening up an important policy 
dimension and stimulating audience discussion, another goal of the conference. 
Khadija Hussein of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens 
Rights provided a sobering and detailed examination of internal violence in the 
Palestinian context. Her presentation, entitled “Internal Violence: Practices of 
the Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza,” drew on the Commission’s rich 
sources of data and monthly and annual reports.
Finally, the Arabic section provides a summary of three papers on gender-
based violence in Palestine, including Ohala Shomar (Sawa Center) who reported 
the results of a pioneering study on sex trafficking entitled “Trafficking in Women 
and Forced Prostitution in Palestine.” Najwah Yaghi presented a 2004 study of 
gender-based violence by Miftah (the Palestinian Center for Democracy),while 
Afaf Zebdeh discussed her research on domestic violence in the Tulkarem District. 
A statistical presentation by Ashraf Hamdan of the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PCBS) on PCBS’s 2005 domestic violence survey is represented in the 
Review by several PCBS tables.
Given that there has been only one national survey of domestic violence, the 
perceptions of many Palestinian women and men that domestic violence is on 
the rise, particularly among communities in highly insecure circumstances, can 
not be verified yet in hard statistics. And the prospects of unified action by polity, 
society and communities are troubled. Some of these complications come from 
the crisis in the Palestinian national project – undermining the solidarity which 
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society and the polity needs to address such issues. But international developments 
since 1990 also pose a challenge if we consider the many effects in Palestine of 
what Lila Abu Lughod calls the “active social life of Muslim women’s rights” 
where international discourses on the status and “rights” of Arab and Muslim 
women circulate through media, institutions and governments, sometimes 
figuring in justifications for military intervention and certainly often informing 
funding priorities of international agencies. How do we find our own way to 
both understand how violence operates in Palestinian families and what can be 
done to prevent it? The IWS conference points to an integrated framework where 
pervasive colonial violence is addressed and challenged, as well as other forms of 
gender-based violence.
Women, Resistance and Colonial Violence:  
Reflections on a Roundtable with Women Ex-Prisoners
rema Hammami
For the closing session of the conference, a round-table was held with three 
women ex-political prisoners. Through the telling of their stories the women 
brought into focus, in often moving ways, the multiple and complicated ways 
that both national oppression and resistances to it are profoundly gendered. 
Each one began with a reflection on what motivated them to participate in 
resistance activity; then reviewed their experience of arrest and interrogation by 
the occupation forces; followed by their lives in prison and finally, their reception 
in their communities upon release.
While Reema Abu Aysheh (24 years old), Bara’a Malik Muhammed (16 years 
old) and Najwa Abdul Ghani (28 years old) described their particular journey 
in distinct and often personal ways, there were also strong commonalities 
in their experiences. First was the way in which their gender was treated as a 
useful vulnerability by their interrogators – with sexual threat and social shame 
used as a strategy by interrogators against all three women. Thus to confound 
them, the women in various ways had to defy the interrogators’ racialized and 
gendered assumptions. At the same time, the interrogation experience remained a 
powerfully transformative but contradictory life marker – one expressed indirectly 
by all three as simultaneously traumatic and empowering.
In comparison, prison life was dominated by the warmth and solidarity of 
other women prisoners. For all three, the relationships forged in prison with 
women under the same extreme circumstances were ones that would remain 
powerfully significant for the rest of their lives. So much so, that the pain of 
leaving behind friends in prison in most cases made the experience of release an 
overwhelmingly sad rather than a happy event. 
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Perhaps the most moving part of the session was the women’s discussion of 
their post-release experiences and “re-integration” into their local communities. 
While all three underlined how important family acceptance and support was 
during their interrogation and imprisonment – it became even more crucial upon 
their release. Bara’a and Najwa returned to their family homes and communities, 
while Reema found employment in Ramallah and moved on to forge a new career. 
But the contrast does not end there. While Reema found a new community 
through her work and political life. Bara’a and Najwa both felt isolated in, and 
censured by, their communities. Najwa’s fiancée broke their engagement while 
she was in interrogation and went on to marry someone else. While Bara’a (who 
entered prison when she was just 14) hopes to finish her studies and go on to 
university, similar to Najwa, she has doubts that she will find a spouse, given the 
discomfort her community has shown towards her ex-prisoner status.
All three women expressed a powerful sense of identity as women ex-prisoners 
– but for Bara’a and Najwa the mutual solidarity and support between women 
in prison has not been replaced by a newfound community. All three noted that 
perhaps a first step to creating a supportive community as well as raising awareness 
of the specific needs of women ex-prisoners would be the creation of an ex-prisoners 
club of women given that the existing prisoners clubs are only for men.
The Institute of Women’s Studies and Conference participants would like to 
express their gratitude to Reema, Najwa and Bara’a for sharing their remarkable 
but often painful experiences with us. Their courage and fortitude stands as a 
powerful example for all women in Palestine. 

ARTICLES
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Feminist Conceptualizations of War;  
Geographies of Thinking 
Dubravka Zarkov
In her keynote address at the IWS conference, Dubravka 
Zarkov, an Associate Professor in Gender, Development and 
Conflict Studies at the Institute for Social Studies in the Hague 
(Netherlands), presented a wide-ranging review and analysis 
of changing feminist frameworks in approaching gender and 
violent conflict. New theoretical and analytical approaches, she 
argued, were often generated by an interplay of the development 
of feminist thinking and the nature of the conflict itself. In 
studying World War II, for example, the focus of research was 
ordinary women’s daily engagement in ‘war efforts,’ with the 
assumption that women’s gains in war will hold in peace. 
In socialist revolutions, the focus was the impact of war on 
women and women’s new roles in war with the assumption 
that women will transform the military as an institution. In 
anti-colonial wars, the focus of research was colonial violence 
against women (particularly rape) and the assumption that 
women will transform post-colonial societies. All of these contain 
conceptualizations of agency and emancipation. Since the 
late 1980s, both the questions raised by contemporary violent 
conflicts and the conceptualizations have complicated notions of 
war as transforming women’s roles in a uniformly emancipatory 
direction. Zarkov notes the multiple and ambiguous positioning 
of women within Western ‘war projects,’ from the Falklands war 
through the two Gulf wars and the war in Afghanistan. An 
earlier optimism about women’s capacities to transform militaries 
and societies is also thrown into question by new research on ‘old 
wars’ and by contemporary realities. New conceptualizations of 
intersectionalitiy (gender plus race plus nationhood), men and 
masculinities, and subjectivities and agency complicate earlier 
assumptions about unitary experiences of women in wartime. 
The occupation of Iraq, and particularly violence against men in 
Abu Ghraib, foreground women’s capacity to perpetrate violence. 
Zarkov noted four lacking or marginal questions in approaching 
the wars of the new millennium:
rEviEW OF WOmEN STudiES  ArTiCLES  13
•	 There is no explicitly feminist political economy of war.
•	 No bringing together of (otherwise rich bodies of 
feminist knowledge on) gendered aspects of globalization, 
militarization, neo-liberal economies, and war and peace; 
those areas of feminist inquiry remain largely separated.
•	 There have been feminist calls for explicit critique of global 
capitalism, but only lately-in relation to war and violence.
•	 Feminist critique of new hegemonic war discourses – such 
as ‘new wars’ - is lacking, though in the last couple of years 
feminist have engaged with the discourses of ‘war on terror’. 
Below, in an excerpt from her 2006 article, “Towards a New 
Theorizing of Women, Gender and War,” Zarkov presents a 
search for new theoretical and analytical approaches to gender 
and violent conflict by investigating feminist analyses of two 
specific issues: sexual violence against women as a gender-specific 
war strategy and women’s participation in war and violence. 
These two issues most aptly reflect recent debates about the limits 
and biases of classical feminist approaches to violent conflict 
and militarism and offer possibilities for innovative thinking. 
Zarkov’s complete article can be found in Handbook of Gender 
and Women’s Studies (Sage 2006), edited by M. Evans, K 
Davis and J. Lorber.
Classical Feminist Studies Revisited
Feminists in any academic discipline have always had to counter hegemonies 
present within their discipline’s theoretical and geo-political traditions, not 
only hegemonies along the line of gender. The hegemonic position of Western 
academia, for example, has offered an advantage to Western feminists and 
feminists living in the West, prioritizing their theorizing against the knowledge 
produced in other parts of the world. Thus, not surprisingly, much of now 
classical feminist scholarship on war and militarism produced in the 1980s has 
often foregrounded the experiences of Western women and Western perspectives 
on the women’s engagements in and against wars and militant movements in other 
parts of the world. 
The equality-versus -difference debate underpins this Western bias1. This debate 
is a product of two fundamentally different feminist projects – liberal feminists’ 
struggle to counter discrimination and secure women’s equal access to all social 
spheres, especially those perceived as exclusively men’s, and radical feminists’ struggle 
to preserve the presumed (essential) difference between nurturing femininity and 
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violent masculinity and to build a society based upon the qualities of the former. It 
has produced a rich, complex, and diverse body of feminist knowledge about war. 
Studies focused on the relationships between women and war (especially the two 
World Wars) rallied around the idea that dramatic social transformations caused 
by wars and women’s engagements in different ‘war efforts’ (be it in war industries 
or in the fighting) offer a chance for lasting change in gender relations and a long-
term effect on women’s emancipation and empowerment. Other studies addressed 
the same relationship using essentialized notions of feminine-cum-maternal care 
and peace-loving as their stating point.2 Yet others analyzed women’s participation 
in national militaries (both in the West and in the Third World) or in militant, 
separatist, and guerrilla movements, arguing that women’s presence could and 
would eventually bring about transformation of masculinist institutions, such as 
the military.3 
These studies have, on the one hand, made immensely valuable contributions 
to our understanding of the relationships between women, gender, and war, and 
of the construction of militarism through notions of femininity and masculinity 
and their impact on women’s lives. On the other hand, they have also produced 
the key analytical frameworks and tools through which women’s experiences and 
the relevance of gender have been approached, often assuming a direct conceptual 
link between women’s agency and women’s participation in armies, militaries, and 
wars as potentially empowering and emancipatory, especially when linked to anti-
colonial or anti-fascist movements. 
However, there is a huge ‘but’ in these conceptualizations. It concerns the nature 
of the army, military, or violent conflict in which women took part. Namely, when 
these were seen as oppressive, hegemonic, or unjust, feminists have seldom analyzed 
the lives of women who joined them, and women’s agency disappeared from view. 
Such an attitude seems to have to do with the general feminist uneasiness at the 
time with women’s participation in politics that can be characterized as right wing: 
nationalist, racist, or religious fundamentalist movements, communal violence, or 
terrorist actions. It seems that feminist discourse of men’s oppression of women 
has been for long ill-equipped for perceiving women active in right-wing political 
groups and militant movements. 
Nevertheless, there have been studies that analyzed lives of women belonging 
to, or associated with, movements, armies, and militaries whose definition 
could hardly be accurate without words such as oppressive or hegemonic. Study 
of German women in the Nazi movement by Koontz (1986) has been one of 
these exceptions, inspiring other studies, such as Cock’s (1992, 1994) analysis of 
the lives of women in the White South African Defence Force (SADF), against 
the backdrop of apartheid.4 Cock compared the role of the women in SADF in 
maintaining the racist and sexist social order of South Africa to that of Nazi women 
in Germany, who (like Nazi women in Koontz’s analysis) contributed to the power 
of an oppressive state ‘by preserving the illusion of love in an environment of hatred’ 
rEviEW OF WOmEN STudiES  ArTiCLES  15
(1994: 154). She also compared the position of women in the SADF with the 
position of women in the MK, an armed wing of the African National Congress. 
Whatever the differences between the two, Cock asserts that in both the SADF and 
the MK, combat played a fundamental role for defining women’s position within 
the military. Those women who participated in combat were – sometimes, and very 
selectively - allowed to participate in the heroic myths and historic narratives of 
their communities; others were relegated to insignificance (p. 159). 
Classical feminist studies of militarism have defined combat as one of the most 
important factors that defined the position of women within Western militaries, 
marking an ultimate difference between men and women.5 As an exclusive preserve 
of men, combat was analyzed as the core axis around which femininities and 
masculinities in most of the militaries and wars have been constructed. However, 
during the World War II, Russian and Yugoslav partisan women were fighting on 
the front lines, as is true for women in many liberation movements in the Third 
World. Therefore, the neat political, ideological, and theoretical constructions of 
combat as exclusively masculine crumble when perspectives and experiences are 
not Western European or North American. 
These realities have become ever more complex in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s, both theoretically and geo-politically. Theoretically, many of the 
basic feminist premises produced in the West have been questioned by the rising 
power of until then marginalized feminist groups within the West (Black, lesbian, 
migrant) and from the Third World. The post-modern turn in feminism, often 
coming from totally different perspectives and with totally different premises, 
further destabilized classical feminist theoretical assumptions. Sometimes the two 
met in highly prominent and visible feminists from the Third World working in 
Western academia, bringing in not only different theories but ultimately, different 
strategies for political action. New theorizing has resulted in undermining some 
of the classical feminist concepts conceived within modernist feminist discourses, 
such as agency, emancipation, and empowerment, and their relationship. New 
strategizing has made feminist knowledge produced by Third World feminists both 
more prominent in the West and more relevant to feminist analysis of Western as 
well as global realities, not only Third World realities. 
These theoretical and strategic trajectories go hand in hand, indicating both the 
unsettling of Western feminist hegemony in the production of feminist knowledge 
by the growing presence of Third World feminists. There is also a growing demand 
within global feminist movements that new theoretical reflections and political 
solidarities be developed to suit the changing geo-political situation of the late 
1980s and early 1990s.6 Simply put, new wars opened new questions for feminism. 
Women soldiers participated in the Falklands and the Gulf war, stirring up old 
debates and posing new challenges to classical feminist studies of war and militarism 
developed in the early 1980s. 
One of these challenges was how to analyze links between gender and other 
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social relations of power, and especially other social identities that seem to have 
gained in visibility and relevance in these wars. It was obvious, for example, that the 
British and American women soldiers fighting in the Falklands and the Gulf war 
became multiple symbols – of nation, racial identity, ideology, emancipation, and 
modernity – and as such, served the purpose of defining the Self and the Other.7 
Wars in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s made the links 
between gender and communal identities even more painfully clear. They brought 
about yet another challenge to feminist theorizing: intersections of these identities 
with gender-based sexual violence against women as a war strategy. As I will 
argue, they also mark a shift from classical feminist focus on women’s agency to 
women’s victimization in war. In the 1990s, the increasing participation of women 
in communal violence and nationalist-cum-religious movements in India and 
South Asia has posed very different questions about the intersectionality of gender, 
collective identities, and violence, and stirred up some of the old debates about the 
concept of agency and its link to empowerment and emancipation. 
Studying Sexual Violence in War
In her analysis of war rapes in Bosnia and Croatia, Rhonda Copelon pointed 
out that war rape ‘takes many forms, occurs in many contexts, and has different 
repercussions for different victims’(1993: 213). She asserted that each instance of 
rape has its own dimension that must not be taken for granted, but that specificity 
does not mean uniqueness or exclusivity: 
The rape of women in the former Yugoslavia challenges the world to 
refuse impunity to atrocity as well as to resist the powerful forces that 
would make the mass rape of Muslim women in Bosnia exceptional 
and thereby restrict its meaning for women raped in different contexts. 
It thus demands recognition of situational differences without losing 
sight of the commonalities. To fail to make distinctions flattens 
reality; and to rank the egregious demeans it. (p. 214) 
Although she never states it explicitly, Copelon’s warnings come as a reaction to the 
fact that the rapes in Bosnia and Croatia were ranked by many feminists, in the 
region and in the West, as the worst in human history, as unique and exceptional.8 
This assumption of exceptionality can be challenged by more recent studies of 
the prevalence of sexual violence in African wars9 and earlier studies of rapes in 
South Asian violent conflicts, and can be attributed to the ambiguous positioning 
of Bosnia both within and outside of the ‘symbolic continent of Europe’(Bakic-
Hayden and Hayden, 1992). Its symbolic inclusion into Europe made rapes there 
more visible and more relevant for Western feminist theorizing on war rapes, 
rEviEW OF WOmEN STudiES  ArTiCLES  17
compared to, for example, rapes during the Rwandan civil war. The violence in 
Rwanda remained for long time quite invisible theoretically in Western feminism, 
although it mobilized women’s organizations and feminist NGOs across the globe.10 
The wars in Yugoslavia, in contrast, caused an enormous academic production in a 
wide range of disciplines.11 
The symbolic exclusion of Bosnia and Yugoslavia from Europe affected the way 
relationship between women, gender, and war in the region was theorized and 
ultimately created a shift in Western feminist theorizing on war. While studies on 
sexual violence against women in wars contributed hugely to our understanding 
of the intersections between gender, sexuality, collective identities, and violence, 
feminist studies of Yugoslav and later, the Rwandan war in the late 1990s largely 
focused on studies of war rapes. Consequently, the concept of gender-based violence 
was reduced to sexual violence. More importantly, classical feminist studies of 
women and war shifted from a conceptualization of agency and empowerment to 
a theoretically and politically much more problematic conceptualization of sexual 
victimization. 
This new prominence, centrality, even, of the raped female victim in feminist 
studies of war could be traced to specific theoretical and political perspectives within 
feminism. On the one hand, in classical feminist theorizing on war,.it is a direct, 
albeit paradoxical, consequence of the centrality of the concept of agency and its 
relation to empowerment and emancipation. Informed by modernist discourses 
that split the social realities of women into private passivity and public activity, 
women’s engagement in militaries and wars with arms in their hands was easy to 
conceptualize as emancipatory and empowering within a feminist framework of 
public agency. The victimhood of civilian women was thus a mirror image of such 
an understanding of agency. As already indicated, geo-politics has a role to play, 
too. Eurocentrism, racism, and Orientalism made sure that there have always been 
women and regions that have been seen as more empowered and emancipated than 
others. Thus, it was also very easy to perceive some of them entirely through the 
prism of victimization. Not surprisingly, women in the Balkan and African wars 
have been among the latter. 
So how are we then to study sexual violence in wars in a way that neither 
jeopardizes the plight of women who have been raped, nor takes sexual 
victimization as the ultimate destiny of women in war? Following Copelon’s 
suggestion of recognizing differences ‘without losing sight of the commonalities’, 
one could argue for comparative studies of sexual violence against women in 
different violent conflicts and other political and violent contexts, such as, for 
example, colonial violence, as well as for more critical exchange between studies 
of peace rapes and war rapes. 
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Studying Women’s Participation in Violent Conflict
Wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were not the only ones relevant for 
change in classical feminist theorizing on women and war. Other wars have also 
challenged established feminist thinking. The NATO war against Serbia over 
Kosovo in 1999 and the wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, justified 
by the doctrine of ‘humanitarian wars’ and ‘pre-emptive strikes’ and the discourse 
of the ‘war on terror’ have further exposed, each in a different way, some of the 
limitation in classical feminist theorizing on violent conflict and a need for new 
approaches.12
Throughout the 1990s, feminist conceptualizations of wars, violent conflicts, 
and militarization have been changing. After studying women in violent conflict 
and its aftermath, femininity and masculinity became much more prominent tools 
of analysis. Then studies of women’s and girls’ experiences of war were joined by 
studies focused on representations of femininities and masculinities in various 
war narratives, on the genderedness of narratives and practices, on links between 
gendered identities, violence, and military and (much less so) on the changing 
nature of warfare.13 
The concepts of women’s agency and empowerment through war became ever 
more important for the global feminist movement. Thanks to feminist efforts in 
2000, the United Nation adopted Resolution 1325, which demanded inclusion of 
women’s anti-war efforts in every step of the official political and social processes 
that transforms a society from war to peace. Resolution 1325 also asked for due 
attention to women’s informal ways of doing peace-politics and for preserving 
gains that women acquired during times of conflict.
 Theoretically, the analyses of women’s agency in and against war continued 
through studies of women’s anti-war activism, individual and collective resilience 
and survival strategies, and community work and leadership.14 However, the old 
optimism about the long-term impact of changes in gender roles during war has 
been losing strength. El-Bushra’s recent work is probably the most significant in this 
respect. She sends two grim warnings. First,while gender roles do change in violent 
conflicts (sometimes dramatically), and women do take greater responsibilities 
within household and community, institutional support that ‘would provide 
women with decision-making power consistent with these new and more 
responsible roles have been slow in coming’ (2004: 169). In other words, gender 
relations may stay intact, even when gender roles change. El-Bushra asserts that ‘the 
ideological underpinnings of gender relations have barely been touched at all and 
may even have become further reinforced through conflict’ (p,169). Second, she 
notes that analyzing how gender becomes utilized in preserving different political 
and economic orders is only one side of a coin. The other is that violent conflict 
and war are used to preserve gender orders. Theoretically, this point has been 
made earlier15, but there were no empirical studies to prove it. El-Bushra’s work on 
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several states in Africa shows how violent conflict becomes a means of preserving, 
achieving ,and re-claiming the lost prerogatives of dominant masculinity (such as 
property, control, and social status) as well as dominant gender hierarchies.16 
Militarization and Women’s Agency 
Much feminist work on the militarization of women’s lives – be it through direct 
participation in the military or through professional and family associations – also 
continues to rely on the concept of women’s agency and empowerment. But here 
too, the straightforward link of militant agency to emancipation and empowerment 
was undermined to quite an extent. First, women’s presence in the military does 
not seem to either change the masculinist nature of these institutions, nor does it 
contributes to the general advancement of women’s social position – quite to the 
contrary. Enloe (2000), for example, shows that defending the rights of women 
soldiers in the US military may affect negatively the rights of civilian women 
affected by the US militarism. For example, US feminists fighting for women 
soldier’s rights against harassment, sexual violence, and gender discrimination 
did ally with the lesbian and gay movement fighting homophobia in the military, 
but not with feminists working with prostitutes around military bases or military 
wives. Still, Enloe insists that women’s soldiering may, ‘under certain conditions’ 
advance the cause for all women (p.287). As a case in point. she gives an example 
of exposing the cover-up of a rape of a woman soldier by a male soldier in the US 
press. Such an exposure of a cover-up, Enloe argues, 
can tear away the legitimising camouflage that has sustained that 
military as a symbol of national pride and security… [c]an make 
that military appear to many citizens for the first time to be little 
more than a men’s club…[A] state official […] may become 
confused. Although state confusion is not as invigorating to witness 
as state transformation, it can be revealing. And revelation can alter 
consciousness. (p.287). 
This perspective is extremely optimistic, but also utterly unrealistic, and it further 
exposes the limits of some of the dominant feminist theoretical approaches to wars 
and militaries, women’s participation in them, and their gendered implications.
Second, the wars of the 1980s and 1990s and those of the twenty-first century 
confirmed the fact that women soldiers and militants are here to stay, not only as 
enlightened freedom fighters in liberation movements of the Third World, nor 
in presumed democratic Western militaries fighting fascism and totalitarianism, 
but in wars gruesome and horrid, not only among oppressed, but also among 
the aggressors. These women and their actions may well be contributing to the 
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maintenance of national or international social orders based on oppression and 
exclusion. Their actions may well be part and parcel of male-defined ideologies 
and projects. But they are neither blind, manipulated victims of patriarchal social 
orders, nor are they empowered or emancipated in the way feminists usually define 
emancipation and empowerment. 
As some of the old political and theoretical certainties of feminism crumbled, at 
least two things seem to have become evident: first, women’s agency, emancipation, 
and empowerment are not necessarily linked only to liberating and progressive 
movements. Second, agency, emancipation, and empowerment may not be the 
best framework at all for studying women’s diverse positioning within violent 
conflict, including women’s participation in violence. 
The region in which both of these points have been taken most seriously in 
feminist theorizing on violent conflict is South Asia. There, a body of knowledge 
has been steadily growing on women’s diverse positioning within a range of very 
different violent conflicts. 
In their work, Rajasingham-Senanayake (2001), J effery (2001), and Butalia 
(2001) suggest that feminist analysis of gender and violent conflict needs 
rethinking, as concepts such as agency and empowerment do not offer satisfactory 
frameworks any longer. First, radical right- wing politics are both appropriating 
feminist language and offering emancipation and empowerment. This practice 
seems to be especially true for the Hindutva nationalist movement in India. 
Second, some South Asian feminists argue that the modernist concept of agency 
is too reductive, as it recognizes only political and public activism, thus missing 
a much broader social and cultural context of women’s engagement in violence 
outside of clearly defined political movements and public spheres.17 Far from 
being either the starting points or the central concepts of feminist theorizing 
of women’s soldiering or sexual victimization in war, agency and victimization 
should be, South Asian feminists suggest, only two among many other narratives 
of women’s positioning within a violent conflict. Instead of assuming the 
presence of either agency or victimization, a feminist studying a violent conflict 
should rather ask when and how agency and victimization are prioritized in the 
experiences and representations of war, what other narratives of women’s and 
men’s positioning within the war there are, and how they are obscured or denied. 
Conclusion: Challenges and Contributions of Feminism
Two regional conflicts during the 1990s have inspired many feminists to study 
sexual violence against women – former Bosnia/Yugoslavia and Rwanda/Africa. 
One region seems so far to inspire many studies of women’s participation in 
violent conflict – South Asia. In all of these regions women – and men – have been 
sexually violated, and have taken part, directly and indirectly, in violence. In the 
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wars through which the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, men have been exposed 
to systematic sexual violence, and women fought as volunteers and within regular 
armies. Women have been tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
for participating in genocide. In some of the African wars, girls and young women, 
as abducted or co-opted soldiers, commit gruesome crimes. But in the case of 
the Balkans and Africa, feminist studies have focused almost exclusively on raped 
women, while in the case of South Asia, sexual violence against women and their 
participation in communal violence have both attracted feminist attention. 
Still, it is clear that these violent conflicts, with sexual violence against women 
and women’s participation in violence, have challenged classical feminist thinking 
about women, war, and militancy, and have raised questions with significant 
theoretical and strategic consequences. Classical feminist studies contributed 
hugely to intersectional analyses of gender and collective social identities, although 
to a large extent, with assumptions about female sexual violability as the starting 
point, and studies of war were usually restricted to studies of war rape. Later 
studies have challenged the conceptualization of agency, empowerment ,and 
emancipation, leading feminists to abandon the assumption that these make their 
presence only within progressive, liberating movements. Many have already noted 
that geo-politics and feminist theorizing about war seem to be related. If this is 
so, then the unsettling of the hegemony of Western feminism offers an enormous 
opportunity for rethinking some basic theoretical and strategic principles, for the 
benefit of better understanding of present-day global realities. 
Endnotes
1 Among classical works on war, militarism 
and masculinity see Elstain (1987), Enloe 
(1983, 1989), Huston (1982), Lloyd 
(1986), and Segal (1987), as well as 
collections by Macdonald (1987).
2 For essentialized difference between 
feminine-maternal-peaceloving-feminist 
politics and masculine-war-waging politics 
see especially Ruddick (1989, 1993) and 
Theweleit (1993). See also Cronberg (1997) 
on Russian women working in military 
industry.
3 Elshtain (1987) suggests that women’s 
participation in armed struggles could 
subvert essentialist representation of 
women as peace-loving. Yuval-Davis 
(1997) argues that demand for equality 
also demands participation in the military. 
Mazurana (2002) and Bosch and Verweijn 
(2002) argue that influx of women in 
the peace-keeping militaries could have a 
transforming effect. 
4 See also Unterhalter (1987). 
5 See also examples by Yuval-Davis (1985) 
for women in Israeli army and Sklevicky 
(1989) for partisan women in Yugoslav 
army during World War Two. According 
to Zwerman (1994) the same applies to 
women in clandestine armed organizations 
in the United States.
6 I especially refer here to works of Mohanty 
(2003) and Kaplan and Greval (1994).
7 See Seidel and Gunther (1988) for the 
Falklands and Farmanfarmaian (1992) and 
Forde (1995) for the Gulf war.
8 For a thorough overview of theoretical 
approaches to rapes in Bosnia see Helms 
(1998) and Zarkov (forthcoming).
9 For the prevalence and forms of sexual 
violence during violent conflicts in 
Africa and elsewhere and for responses 
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by NGOs and human rights groups see 
especially Sajor (1998) and Turshen and 
Twagiramariya (1998). For the post-war 
sexual violence and its consequences see 
Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen (2001). 
10 Lately, more studies of Rwandan war 
are available in the West, although these 
are often from Western authors. See, 
for example, Enloe (2000) on rapes and 
Gervais (2004) on Rwanda’s women 
personal, economic, and socio-political 
security after the conflict, respectively. See 
also Twagiramariya and Turshen (1998) 
on sexual politics and Mibenge (2005) on 
Rwandan tribunals.
11 For a review see Zarkov (forthcoming).
12 One could even say that these wars 
exposed the lack of feminist theorizing 
on war, as some of the most important 
debates on war and violent conflict ,such 
as those on ‘greed vs.grievance’ or on 
‘new wars,’ have been actually proceeding 
without much feminist input. 
13 For literary and cultural representations of 
gender and war see especially collections 
by Cooper et al (1989), Cooke and 
Woollacott (1993) and the study of World 
War I by Melman (1998), who re-defines 
both the war (including the decades that 
led to it, and the decades after it, that 
were an introduction to the World War 
II) and Europe (including its colonial 
and imperial domains of power). For the 
changing nature of war, see, for example 
Schott (1996).
14 See, for example, Afshar and Eade (2004), 
Meintjes et al (2001), and Turshen and 
Twagiramariya (1998).
15 See especially Connell (2002).
16 Dolan (2005) argues the same.
17 See Jeffrey (2001) on political agency 
and Manchanda (2001) on women’s 
violent agency within the domestic 
sphere – through support of the militancy 
and violence of their family members, 
especially sons.
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Clad in mourning: violence,  
Subjugation and the Struggle of the Soul 
Stefania Pandolfo
In this excerpt from her keynote address at the IWS conference, 
Stefania Pandolfo, Associate Professor of Anthropology at the 
University of California at Berkeley returns to a seminal work of 
Frantz Fanon to reflect on how a leading Moroccan sheikh and a 
Moroccan religious healer approach the “choking of the soul”: the 
debasement of life described by marginalized Moroccan youth as 
“slow death.” Her interweaving of psychological, political and 
religious concepts offers a productive framework to “reflect on 
the question of destruction and trauma,” whether in Morocco 
or in elsewhere in the region. Her forthcoming book, The Knot 
of the Soul: Madness, Psychiatry, Islam, will be published by 
The University of Chicago Press. Pandolfo is also the author of 
Impasse of the Angels: Scenes from a Moroccan Space of 
Memory, The University of Chicago Press 1997.
Fanon’s countermove
There is a zone of nonbeing, an extraordinarily sterile and arid 
region, an utterly naked declivity, from where an authentic arising 
can be born. In most cases, the black man lacks the advantage of 
being able to accomplish this descent into a real Hell. (Franz Fanon, 
Black Skin, White Mask)
I would like to begin my reflections in the shadow of Black Skin, White Mask (1952), 
Franz Fanon’s disturbing and resolute text conceived in the aftermath of anger and 
resentment , when, in his words, he could approach “these truths…without being 
burned.” Fanon’s text ponders the entanglement of subjugation, violence, trauma, 
and desire, in a quest for the possibility of thinking and struggle in the midst of 
entrapment and destruction, and in the utter proximity of death. I want to register 
the continuing relevance of that vision for us today, at a time when the forms of 
psycho-political imprisonment he describes and dissects are ever more present at 
the planetary level, and the possibility of imagining an exit seems to remain out 
of sight. We live in a time when walls and borders proliferate1, at once concrete 
standing partitions (to push back, and to shelter from the threat of “infiltration”), 
and phantasmal exclusions, symbolic obliterations, within the self and the nation.
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This is a predicament exemplified here, in the 1967 Palestinian occupied 
territories, by the proliferation of colonial settlements, borders, check points, 
and areas of restricted access, in a shifting topology where inside and outside 
interpenetrate and overlap, and occupation becomes ever present, capillary, and 
yet invisible and unrecognizable.2 In a recent paper May Jayyusi has argued 
that the result of such a strategy of power, rendered more acute after the Oslo 
accords, is that Palestinian existence is “entombed” or buried alive –-it falls out of 
sovereignty and out of life, out of the legal responsibility of the Israeli state, into 
a radical abandonment, all the while being subjected to the violent operation of 
Israeli military force. She cites a poem by Mahmoud Darwish: 
What will we do, before this death? 
Adjacent to our lives
We live and we don’t live
In this light, listening to the testament left by the youth who died, and to the 
testimonies of their families, Jayyusi understands the martyr operations during the 
second Intifada as efforts to break the entombment, force visibility in the mode 
of a “public witness,” when all forms of witnessing have become impossible. In 
a related sense, she sees the martyr operations as attempts at redeploying and re-
signifying death, in its asphyxiating proximity and in a state of siege, and by that 
gesture regenerating the possibility of life and of community3. However painful 
and only thinkable within a space of unending violence, they are attempts at 
repossession (of both death and life), which, she argues, are mediated by the 
experiential vocabularies of an Islamic ethical frame of reference, where divine 
self-sufficiency can come to interrupt an unjust worldly rule, and where the 
question of the law (as externality) can be upheld to interrupt the instrumentality 
and atomization of “rights”. 
My considerations are rooted in my ethnographic work in Morocco, and 
in the insistent questions raised by my interlocutors to me, as well as in the 
predicaments of their lives. I read Fanon side by side with a parallel reflection 
on destruction, trauma, and the possibility of ethical-political struggle in a 
contemporary Islamic tradition, in the context of a renewed problematization 
of the concept of jihad al-nafs, “the struggle of the soul” (but also struggle at 
such), in relation to the experience of oppression, violence, pain, melancholy, 
and what Fanon calls the “annihilation of being.” I will consider the figure of 
“spiritual murder” (tadbih al-ma`nawi) in a sermon by the Moroccan Shaykh 
Abdessalam Yassine, and reflect on the practice and thought of a Moroccan faqih 
an-nafs and mu`alij, an imam and a healer of madness, with particular reference 
to what he dubs as the predicament of tadiyq al-nafs, the choking of the soul. 
“Spiritual murder” and “soul choking” speak of the subjugation of the soul, and 
the oppression of the collectivity, when life shrinks, death is generalized in a 
rEviEW OF WOmEN STudiES  ArTiCLES  27
proximity that makes it unthinkable, and the divine message is no longer present 
in the heart. Not unlike in Fanon’s own concern, the ethical-political question 
becomes that of shedding light on, revealing, interrupting, such a state of things: 
a disclosure that is a necessary shock, towards the re-instantiation of a life of 
the soul. It is in terms of my work with the Imam, in the concluding section of 
the paper, that I more specifically address the Fanonian question as that of a the 
struggle for a repossession of the imagination; a struggle that is not solely framed 
in terms of sovereignty, but as a transformation of pain in a space of mourning. 
I have written elsewhere from the standpoint of those whose soul is “choked”, 
attempting to register, and convey as much as possible the pathos of that experience 
in the singular trajectory of their lives, attempting to listen and letting my text, 
and myself, be transformed by the impact of their voice (Moroccan youths, torn 
between their attachment to a life and a place they experience as unlivable, and a 
drive to exit, migrate, at the risk of dying, debating whether such a life is worth 
living.) In this, I have kept pondering Jean Genet’s question in his memoir-report 
on his Palestinian journey and the Palestinian struggle4, written in the aftermath 
of Shatila: what does it mean to tell the truth? To bear witness to the lives and 
deaths of others, to struggle, to pain, to revolution? To bear witness to the dead, 
the disappeared, including them in one’s address, in the name of the living? Such 
was, for Genet, the (impossible) yet real task of the witness.
Fanon pronounces his phenomenological diagnosis of the annihilation of being 
in the form of a psychodynamics of “intrusion”. Sovereignty and domination are 
located at the core of psychic space, and they are intimately related to desire and 
the scene of the phantasm. He describes the raced/colonized subject as constituted 
by the violent intrusion of the other, the colonizer, in the psychic space of the self, 
an intrusion that evacuates the self, and replaces it with the poisonous object of the 
other’s fantasy5, an object with which the self will coincide. The intrusion is a seizure 
of the imagination and of the bodily space of the other; an occupation understood 
in spatial, almost military terms, as a shrinking of vital space, which snatches the 
self and pulverizes its corporeal schema, halting the work of the imagination and 
producing in its place a somatic hallucination. At the center of Fanon’s argument 
is the “attack” of the Gaze, the look of the Other, the white person, but also the 
colonial system, the white mythology (with the central role played by the fantasy of 
the terrifying and sexually powerful African in European culture), and ultimately 
the white symbolic (“language” and “thought” as power-charged European assets6). 
But most important for this discussion, the attack of the gaze is also an encounter 
with a drive to destruction as such: a force of disintegration that is both in the 
Other, and is found at the traumatic core of the self, in as much as the core of the 
self is born in the Other, and is inhabited by desire. 
Fanon, a psychiatrist, analyzes the intrusion as a psychotic invasion, in a 
phobic and paranoid universe where the inner and the outer mirror each other 
and coincide, and the subject’s unconscious aggressively performs the logic of the 
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colonial state. The moral law, Fanon says, Kant’s universal imperative, is falsified 
in the colony, it reveals its other side, as destructive “carnivorous power” and 
perverse enjoyment7. In the colony the symbolic order is maimed, for the seizing 
of the imagination, the intrusion, swallows both space and time, and abolishes at 
once the possibility of culture and of the unconscious as the site of mediation and 
symbolic transformation. The raced subject, Fanon says, is “clad in mourning”, 
a kind of living death. It is precisely this asphyxiating proximity of death, of a 
death within, and of death all around, which, Fanon is saying, makes it a arduous 
yet fundamental task to “think” death, subjectivize it as a singular experience 
of being, re-socialize it, think the possibility of a collectivity, from it. Ethical 
violence, for Fanon, was aimed at reactivating the possibility of struggle.8
Fanon and the Question of Trauma
At a time when the atomistic individuation and instrumentality of suffering 
invalidate the possibility of any simple reference to the concepts of trauma and 
witnessing, when the experience of pain can only be authenticated as standardized, 
psychological, and individualized suffering (through a diagnosis of post-traumatic 
stress disorder, for instance); when the representation of traumatic events is a 
central piece in the construction of evidence and cultural reality, occupying the 
core of medical-juridical institutions, human rights practices and ever-growing 
media-markets, it seems important to carve a place for reflection and listening that 
might drift aside, in an “untimely” fashion, from the encompassing hegemony of 
these vocabularies.9
A return to Fanon’s dissection of the colonial traumatic, and an engagement 
with a reflection on violence, death and struggle in the complex field of Islamic 
tradition, can provide an angle from which to ask again the question of trauma 
in its full political, existential and eschatological force; to reclaim the way in 
which a singular pain, an event of madness, addresses a collectivity, in both 
medical and theological terms. For at stake is an engagement with the alterity 
that makes the self. In that space it becomes perhaps possible to conceptualize 
and discern the work of what Walter Benjamin had called a “violence for the 
sake of the living.” The question becomes: how can one repossess space and 
being, what Fanon called “ontological resistance”, imagine exits that are not 
already inscribed in instrumental logics that further and reproduce exclusion and 
oppression? In a different tone than in Fanon’s later writings, in Black Skin White 
Mask the emphasis is not on liberation (however ambiguous and never fulfilled 
is the space of freedom in Fanon’s later work) but on entrapment and mourning. 
The ethical-political task is the pursuit of an “anamorphic” vision, a vision that 
reveals through the gesture of a backward glance; a vision capable of exposing the 
machinery of subjugation, and its relation with the alterity of desire. In a space 
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of mourning, it is the honing of a melancholic gaze that may become capable of 
interrupting the ideological secret of domination and race. Such a vision, Fanon 
suggests, is the Orphic gift of a descent into Hell. 
Spiritual Murder
Let me introduce now a political-spiritual figure of failed mourning in today’s 
Morocco: the “spiritual slaughter” of the youth (tadbih ma`nawi) in the words of 
Shaykh Abdessalam Yassine. Shaykh’s Yassine’s figure of failed mourning belongs 
within an Islamic tradition in which the ability to visualize and vicariously 
experience death, and the related ability to engage in a spiritual struggle that 
transforms the soul, as well as the arenas of collective life, is pivotal for the 
possibility of ethics and political critique. 
“Spiritual murder” is the destruction, or crippling, of this ethical faculty. It 
describes the subjugation of the soul and the oppression of the collectivity. The 
question becomes, for Shaykh Yassine, as well as many others, that of shedding 
light on, disclosing this state of things. In a sermon delivered in the aftermath 
of violent acts committed in Casablanca in April 2007, when five young men 
exploded themselves in various locations in the city, Sheikh addressed the 
predicament of the Moroccan, in the larger context of a historical-theological 
diagnosis. His sermon was offered in the mode of urgency, and in the committed 
style of ethical-religious admonition. He began by imploring God for help and 
forgiveness in these troubled times: “Morocco is burning [al-maghrib rah taythraq] 
Casablanca is burning [darlbaida tathraq], violence [al-`unf] is consuming the 
youth, the youth self-consume [literally: are eating their souls/selves – shababu 
ya’kulu nafsahu] and are setting themselves on fire.” (Sheikh Yassine never uses the 
term istishad, martyrdom, in the sermon; he uses expressions indicating “setting 
ablaze” or “burning”, or throwing oneself into the fire.) He continues:
“Some [young people] flee into the sea [haribin ila al-bahri], to the 
water, at the risk of drowning and never reaching land; others flee 
into the fire, they choose to immolate themselves with fire.” They 
prefer to die, he continues, “rather than enjoying the gifts of an 
unjust regime: homelessness, unemployment, impoverishment, and 
lack of guidance and ideas, the lack of thinking [tafkir].” 
“In these days of anguish and trouble, some youth astray 
[mudallal] are exploding themselves in the streets of Casablanca. 
Fear is everywhere, people are hiding from the authorities, in 
the basements, many are on the run, and those who can find in 
themselves enough strength and courage [lli fi nafsihi al quwwa wa 
as-shaja`a] choose to commit suicide [intihar] rather than being 
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tortured and murdered in prison. They prefer to shed their their 
blood on the streets and the sidewalks of the city, rather than having 
their blood shed in the torture centers of the regime.”
“These youths are astray” [had shabab mudallal], declares the sheikh after a long 
pause. They need education, a spiritual, moral education, they need to form their 
character. And he reflects on the meaning of that word, “mudallal”, from “dalla” 
and “dalal”, “error”, in the theological sense of having lost the path to God. And 
yet, he says, who should be called accountable for their deaths? For the death of 
those youth who commit suicide and take their life [yantahiruna wa yaqtuluna 
anfusahum]. Aren’t the modern Pharaohs accountable?
“They massacre our sons” [yudhabbihuna abna’kum], repeats the Sheikh, 
echoing a Quranic passage (Qur’an 14:6), the modern-day Pharaohs, they are 
slaughtering them right now. But while at the time of Pharaoh the slaughter was 
literal, he adds – Pharaoh literally slit the throats of the new generation; now the 
slaughter is spiritual in nature, it is a moral slaughter (tadbih ma`nawi). 
But what does this mean? In as much as the Sheikh also denounces the 
“literal violence” of the modern (Pharaonic) state, the torture, interrogations, 
disappearances and murders, why is he insisting that today’s violence is moral 
or spiritual? This is the key moment in the sermon, when the Sheikh at once 
lends voice to the experience of the youth and provides a reading of the specific 
phenomenology of violence of present times. In calling the massacre “symbolic/
moral” he is engaging with the political-spiritual question of the debasement 
of life, a life-death that is for these youths a living death, or in the words of the 
Moroccan youth I talked to in my research, “a slow death” (al-mawt al-bati’). 
The “slow death”, in their words, is the choking of life, a death by lack of place, 
a way of become a spirit, an arhwah, while still alive, a living dead. This, in the 
reckoning of the youths I spoke to, happens through the shutting of all doors, 
the flattening of the horizon, a desensitization, which is metonymically embodied 
in the use of drugs, that “send off the soul”, and render the body insensitive and 
rigid like a piece of wood or like a corpse. 
Sheikh Yassine’s question, in calling the massacre “moral”, is whether such 
“choked life” is capable of engaging with the thought and the experience of 
death, the necessary path to vision and regeneration, and to the possibility 
of emancipation – death understood as a spiritual practice of awakening in 
Islamic tradition. For, as the 12th Century faqih al-nafs Abdu Hamid al-Ghazali 
put it, “Death cannot be understood by those who do not understand life.” It 
becomes clear, then, that for Sheikh Yassine a moral/spiritual murder is much 
more destructive than a literal one, for it turns the living into undead, incapable 
of experiencing either life or death, and forecloses the subject’s capacity for 
ethical self-transformation. In this reflection, he comes remarkably close to the 
considerations of Fanon on subjugation, death, and the possibility of regeneration 
rEviEW OF WOmEN STudiES  ArTiCLES  31
in the assumption of death in life, as a crucial dimension of responsibility. For, 
under the present circumstances, it is impossible for the youth to discern between 
a life, which is death-form, and a meditation on death which is an opening to the 
possibility of life.
“Spiritual slaughter”, Sheikh Yassine explains, is caused by the injustice of 
a tyranny that concentrates all wealth and power in the hands of the few, in a 
situation in which it becomes both self-evident and justified that only some have 
access to humanity. The slaughter, or tadbih, destroys the possibility of imagining 
the future, as well as of relating to the past. It freezes time, and reduces life to a 
flat surface without exits. The only “exits”, under the rule of “soul murder”, are 
suicide and self-immolation, if one has the strength and courage to pursue them. 
But these are flights, says Sheikh Yassine, and constitute a religious transgression, 
a ma`siyya. Courage, itself a kind of awareness, is also a temptation. Sheikh 
Yassine rests on that indecidability, embraces the ambiguity of his diagnosis, 
condemning but also measuring the immensity of the question, and the difficulty 
of the answer. 
The Battlefield of the nafs 
I pursue this question of “soul murder”, and its implication for a possible ethics 
of struggle (jihad/jihad al-nafs) through an analytic description of the therapeutic 
practice of a Moroccan Imam10, not a traditional healer, indeed also not a Sufi, 
but an active member in the local Islamic revival.
In my reading I attempt to show how in the specificity of his practice he 
instantiates a mode of bearing witness that is at once singular and collective, acting 
at the level of the singular body, and of the unbearable pain of the community. 
This double movement testifies to a re-politicization of thinking, where the lament 
of the personal voice recapitulates and addresses the pain of a collectivity.11 The 
Imam reflects on the nature of a drive to destruction, and on the question of evil 
(through the Islamic figuration of Shaytan) as a heterogeneity and a struggle ever 
present within the community, a struggle which, fundamentally, is also internal 
to the nafs [the soul/self ] itself. His sermons and therapeutic interventions 
are aimed at a trans-figuration, at the possible repossession of what, reaching 
to classical Islamic theories of the passions, the soul, and the heart, the Imam 
names an “affirmative imagination” [suwarān ijābiyya]. In his discussion of anger, 
melancholy, and pain, he postulates a political-ethical work of the imagination, 
one that is capable of generating “action” from within a space of trauma.
The Imam practices a renewed form of Quranic healing and spiritual-political 
practice known as ` ilāj shar`ī, [divinely sanctioned healing].12 In the conversations 
we had about the theological-ethical framework of his therapeutic intervention, 
the Imam made an explicit connection between his active investment in `ilāj 
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shar`ī [divinely sanctioned healing], understood as a renewed instantiation of the 
practice of faith, and a larger effort towards a political critique of the condition 
of the self/soul in a state of material and spiritual dispossession, of subjugation by 
an oppressive state apparatus, and of utter hopelessness, at the limit of despairing 
life and trust in God. 
The Imam spoke insistently in terms of a question, one that gave impetus 
to his work and shaped every aspect of his life. The question concerned the 
possibility of ethical existence in the vicinity of destruction, trauma and madness, 
and in the shadow of spiritual dispossession. He asked it at the intimate level of 
his encounters with the sick and the afflicted (musāb, marīd), from a place at the 
limit of life and the law. His was a political and yet intimate calling which, the 
Imam once told me, was the reason why he chose to embrace the life of a religious 
scholar and healer, giving up his career as a student of law at the University of 
Rabat. 
In our conversations, the Imam addressed a condition in which being is 
threatened with extinction, paralyzed, and in turn manifests itself in “petrified 
forms of pain” engraved in the human soul. Upon our first meetings the Imam 
made it clear that he embraced the practice of healing and the persona of the 
healer differently than it was often understood in Morocco. While healing had 
traditionally been associated with a charismatic authority, the authority he 
claimed for himself was that of a scholar and a religious guide, a murshid: 
“The person who aspires to be a healer [al-mu`ālij], if he wants to 
cure–must be a person who is entrusted with a religious task. A 
healer must be a learned scholar of the Qur’an and of the Hadith, 
or he or she must be a spiritual guide [murshid], capable of giving 
religious advice.”13
In his practice as a healer, the Imam attended to those who addressed themselves 
to him or were brought by their families because of severe psychopathological 
symptoms. In some cases it was their first attempt at a cure; but most often they, 
arrived at his door after a long therapeutic quest across healers and sanctuaries 
for the mad, visits to psychiatrists, and in some cases after a hospitalization. He 
listened, asked questions (always including in his address the family members 
who had come with the sick, for he saw sickness as a knot in a larger history 
of obliterated connections), proposed a cure that consisted of herbal remedies 
that he prepared himself and Quranic recitations, the practice of ruqya (literally 
“spiritual elevation”), in which specific passages of the Qur’an bearing an effective 
relation with the person’s condition are read to the sick. At the outset, in the 
Imam’s analytic description, the work of the healer is that of a political-spiritual 
diagnosis. The space of the cure addresses an affliction which is singular, but which 
is also a symptom that speaks of a collective condition, and a history: healing, and 
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the sickness itself, are a kind of bearing witness. The illness, the madness, decries 
the hypocrisy of a social life devoid of care and equity, the violence of the state, 
and the rule of injustice and corruption. It is a de-forming mirror that “reveals” a 
state of terror that has broken the subject. 
The event of madness is treated by the Imam as a traumatic awakening of the 
collectivity as a whole. It is a “disclosure”. Illness is not an individual condition, 
even though it affects a person in a singular way. What becomes manifest, says the 
Imam, are the agency of evil and the reality of destruction (Shaytan, the Quranic 
figuration of the problem of evil), which work simultaneously at the level of the 
oppressive structures of the “Pharaonic” state,14and in the intimate struggles and 
intractable heterogeneities of the human soul/self [al-nafs]. 
The event of madness is thus also the disclosure of a system of terror, injustice 
and abuse. The Imam describes and contrasts two opposed forms of sovereignty, 
in what is at once a “medical” and a politico-spiritual diagnosis. On the one 
hand, there is the just sovereignty of God, to which human beings must submit, 
and in which they find agency and deliverance. On the other, there is the unjust 
tyranny of the Jinn– and Shaytan behind the jinn (and the forms of government 
that resemble its rule), which subjugates and enslaves those who fall under its 
power by reducing them to a state of moral impairment. Through his discussion 
of sorcery [sihr] as a prime cause of madness, the Imam describes a society at the 
edge of heresy, calling for the urgent need of spiritual renewal. The scene is set of 
a world of injustice and abuse, predicated on falsity, which is at once a description 
of theological failing, the risk of eternal damnation, and of political corruption in 
the mundane, historical world. The image of the jinns who bring “information” 
to the “false healer” is reminiscent of the mukhābarāt—the infamous secret police, 
and its routine recourse to torture and assassination, in the secret basements of 
police stations. (Echoes can be heard here of the actual reality of torture and 
secret detention experienced by many youth in recent years).
Untruth [kadhib], injustice [zulm], and oppression are the characteristics of 
the world of the jinn: they are also dispositions located in the human soul. The 
prime cause of sorcery [sihr], and hence madness, argues the Imam, is, al-ikrāh 
[coercion] the absence of justice, the impossibility of an equitable recourse by the 
oppressed, as well as the condition of intimate terror and intimidation in which 
the person is thrown by that state of coercion: “Human beings exist in justice 
[ādami wajūdi al-`adl]. And justice is violated by way of coercion [ikrāh].” The 
second cause of sorcery, and hence madness, is the envy [al-hasad] generated by 
the delusion of commodities.
The event of madness, in other words, “shows” the obverse of the subjugation 
of the subject in the everyday unfolding of social life. Sometimes, as psychoanalyst 
Piera Aulagnier has written, madness is the only path open for the subject, and 
“people said to be crazy, in the ordinary sense of the term, show us what was 
necessary to do in order to survive.”15
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In the discourse of the Imam the heterogeneity of evil is clearly at work in 
a double movement between the collective register of what might be called a 
“prophetic diagnosis” (anamorphic visibility) concerning the state of subjugation 
of the society as a whole,16 and the battlefield of the nafs, where the longings and 
passions–desire, the alterity that makes the self–are inspired by, engage with, and 
are transformed into the destructive force of Shaytan. In his words:
I said that al-nafs is the yeast, the fertile land that Shaytan cultivates 
and tills; but he does not cultivate grapes, figs, and pomegranates! 
He cultivates desires, cravings and longings [shawqān] and with 
them blasting and bombs. From the moment of their manifestation 
they make an impression in the nafs, leave a mark, and set it ablaze. 
It is not an external demon that strikes the person, but an internal enemy, a capacity 
for evil that is at once internal and external to the nafs [soul]. What is important to 
grasp in this duality, and in the notion of struggle itself, is that the Imam is speaking 
of a positive challenge, the challenge of a radical heterogeneity that sets the rhythm 
and pulsation of a form of life . Evil in this sense is a revealing element, which at 
once dis-figures the status quo, providing an always-precarious angle of visibility, 
and sets a flow of subjectivity in movement, in the punctuation of an ethical life. 
On that border, a folding of the inside and the outside, of the soul with its intimate 
enemy, of the personal and the collective, is found jihād al-nafs, a central figure 
of the agonistics of the soul: “spiritual effort, or exercise,” but also “jihad,” in the 
sense of war. To understand the struggle of jihād al-nafs solely in the sense of the 
refinement, or the perfectibility, of the soul, reduces the stakes of what for the 
Imam is an actual struggle, fraught with danger, and with the never resolved risk of 
a radical loss. Ethical being is precisely that intimate struggle, with a heterogeneity 
that can never be resolved, and with a violence that is forever lurking 
For the Imam, it is only when the struggle subsides, when the nafs, and the 
heart, become inert, and are turned into stone, that ethical being ceases to exist, 
and all “activity” stops. This is what happens in acute melancholy [al-ka’āba: 
sorrow, grief, depression, gloom, melancholy], the condition the Imam calls 
“tadyiq al-nafs,” “soul choking.”
Soul choking, pain, and the imagination
Well aware of the double-edged resonance of the concept of amrād nafsiyya 
(“spiritual afflictions,” a term that translates, in other contexts, as psychological 
and mental illnesses), the Imam argues that the “maladies of the soul” are not 
located in the body but are often manifested as, or lie at, the origin of physical 
illnesses. The Imam points to the passion of anger [al-ghadab], and the sentiment 
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of grief [al-ka’āba] as prime causes of illness—a malady of the soul that also affects 
the body, and that can lead to madness, melancholy, or suicide. He says:
La taghdab! Restrain from anger! It is anger and grief [al-ka’āba] that 
are the first cause of illness for the soul/self [al-nafs]. The Prophet 
only became angry when the hudūd allāhi [ God’s boundaries] were 
violated. Hence the foundation, the root of everything, is faith and 
the certainty of faith [al-imān wa al-yaqīn]. If the foundation is 
strong we call it in our sharī`a “al-yaqīn,” conviction, trust. When 
something happens, in the world, in your life, a calamity, a loss, you 
do not become angry. Faith and trust can contain the drive of anger. 
Our trust in God tells us: this is the power of God [adar allāhi]. 
And my own volition is from God: “irādati min allāh.”
He goes on to reflect on why people today are incapable of experiencing the ground 
of faith. What is happening today, in Morocco and other parts of the Muslim 
world, he says, is similar to what happens to “people in the West”: “They want to be 
whatever they wish, but life, our life span, is decided by God. They end up clashing 
with the real [al- wāqi` - in other words, they dwell in illusion]. They are hit by 
reality and in the end become sick. They are overwhelmed by grief or despair.”
The Imam’s psycho-somatic and spiritual-physiological approach stresses at 
once the desiring soul’s risk of straying (al-dalal: from the path of God, and from 
ethical existence) in the context of contemporary life, the reality of exclusion [al-
hirmān], dispossession and grief, the temptation of evil, as a struggle internal to 
the nafs, and the affective impact of the Imagination, of “images,” on the heart. 
In contrast to the privileged status of al-`aql [the intellect] in Western thought, 
in the Imam reading the heart [al-qalb] is the critical site. Faith and imagination 
play a fundamental role.
When the Drive of Anger comes to dominate the body [musaitira fī 
al-jism], in the heart and in the flow the circulation of blood speeds 
up, becomes faster and faster in the veins and the arteries of the 
person, and that human being comes out of normal, customary life 
[yakhruj al-insān ` an ma’lūfi, comes out of the traced path], exits the 
real world [al-wāqi`], and this causes crimes to happen, or rebellion, 
or sin; the crimes may be theft, robberies, killings, illicit sex, or 
gathering of wealth through falsity and usurpation.
Faith [al-imān] is the basis, when associated with conviction [al-yaqīn]. Yet there 
can only be faith, trust in God, if there is activity in the sense of humanly shared 
ethical action [al-`amal], which is sorely lacking in a community mined by social 
exclusion, injustice, and by a form of death-in-life. Or, in a related sense, faith 
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and the authenticity of ethical action are inaccessible in a community where the 
intimate proximity of Islamic ideals has been lost, where there is no equity and 
where the power of commodities and the lure of consumption make vanish the 
call for the values of reciprocal help and support, the sense of justice, and the 
remembrance of death in daily life as the foundation of ethical action. In such a 
world, says the Imam, the heart that receives the affects and visions of the nafs, in its 
worldly desires, as well as in its incurable sadness and grief, is all too often no longer 
the heart of a Muslim17. It is thus that the nafs becomes prey to the whispering 
and the terror of Shaytan, and sends its harmful imaginings to the heart—visions 
of dissolution and destruction, of irretrievable loss. The heart is affected, and 
participates in destruction, until the self begins choking, all sense of life vanishes, 
and the person gives into destruction and self-annihilation: “What is the cause of 
suicide [al-intihār]? It is from the choking of the nafs [tadyīq al-nafs]. And what is 
the cause of choking? It is Shaytan. Shaytan whispers in the ears of the person, “You 
will die, death is your only perspective, and the human being chokes.”
Tadyīq al-nafs, the oppression, or choking of the soul, is the result of an 
unbearable pain that paralyzes and sculpts in the soul and in the heart, as if in 
stone, images of destruction that shut the door to all possibility of imagining a 
horizon, erecting the high walls of a claustrophobic space . Soul choking describes 
a world of living death, where the proximity with death is such that there is no 
longer a relation, “death” can no longer be “imagined.” It is Fanon’s point. The 
Imam explains:
Hence the nafs sends to the heart negative and hopeless images 
of the future, and the heart forms an image of life as life-burned 
[hayāt mudrama] life-destroyed, and starts imagining that nothing 
good can happen in the future, only oppression and disaster are 
foretold, that all that there is pain and torture [al-`adhāb], poverty 
and exclusion, dispossession and destitution [hirmān]. Only that 
will be. And so that person [insān] lives a burning moment, God 
protect us from Harm […]
And these images that the nafs receives in the form of a devilish whisper, [al-
waswās], colonize and murder the heart, which in truth is not the heart of a 
Muslim. If the heart is deserted by faith, the person accepts those images, 
welcomes them, and they set it ablaze. And choking, the oppression of the soul 
[tadyīq], instills terror in that person [tayīq b-l-insān]. And he can no longer 
aspire to something that might bring renewal, something affirmative, other than 
his own dying, and thinks incessantly of the way in which to bring about the 
limit of death. This is suicide.
In the logic of the Imam’s description, in this sense, the imagination turns into 
an agent of destruction because it is itself captured, snatched, by an invasion of 
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media images, images of a desire haunted by the commodity, by the sense of failure 
and impossibility, because its capacity for spiritual work is disabled. The soul/self 
registers those realities, bears witness to them in its pain, in the “impression” they 
make on the heart, but that registering does not lead to forms of engagement, 
to “thinking,” to ethical and political action [al-`amal]. Pain is internalized as a 
wound, incorporated as despair, and the imagination reinforces the subjugation 
of the subject, which manifests itself as a death drive. Soul choking is the Imam’s 
depiction of such acute melancholy, a melancholy described by some of the youth 
with whom I discussed this question18 in terms of another figure of despair: al-
qanat, the melancholy-boredom, loss of all hope, which empties the self, and 
“sends it off” into nothingness. 
We say of a person qnat– he or she fell into despair. A human being, 
when he falls into despair, all doors are shut for him, he can no 
longer see or distinguish anything, and abandons himself to drugs. 
Lhag wāhed l-hadd, he has reached a limit. His head is full; he sees 
only one thing, hanging himself; his rūh, his soul-spirit, doesn’t stay 
in place, is no longer there, he sent it off with the drugs…And as for 
what is on his mind, only one thing: death.
It is in this sense that the Imam stresses the concept of an affirmative imagination, 
“affirmative images” [suwarān ijābiyya], 
The Messenger of God opposes despair, opposes grief. Islam opposes 
gloom [al-`ubūsiyya], struggles against sadness. Today many 
Muslims, turning their faces in a petrified sadness, are pervaded by 
gloom. 
Beyond this struggle of images is the concern with enabling once again al-`amal, 
the possibility of ethical action—activity, work, movement, and the fact of having 
a job, an active role in society, which, the Imam says, is the condition of possibility 
of faith”: Imān bidūni `amal lā yumkin, he says; “it is impossible to have faith 
without work.” Yet fulfilling this obligation under conditions of hardship, such 
as those that characterize life in his neighborhood, as in many similar locations 
in Morocco and the Muslim world, cannot be taken for granted. In the midst of 
our discussion of imagination and the passions, the Imam cites a much debated 
Hadith: “Kāda al-faqr an yakūn kufran,” poverty leads to kufr, it is close to being 
kufr.” Because, he adds, “poverty causes exhaustion and hardship, disaster and 
ruin.” [ya`ni `an yakun taba`n, wa shaqa`n, wa khusran]. In the words of F. Esak, 
“You cannot truly submit to God if you are under the yoke of hunger. Such 
submission is a form of coercion.” The subjugation and annihilation of being is 
an ethical, but also a political question.19
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For the Imam the two questions are related. Traumatic becoming is a form of 
awakening, not a consolation philosophy. Yet prior to the possibility of reinstating 
ethical action and bearing practical witness to faith, it is necessary to guide the 
nafs to reposition its relation to the experience of pain, and to the “infraction”, the 
invasion (Fanon) that caused the soul to choke. It is a question of transforming 
pain: from a harbinger of destruction to an exercise for thinking/remembering, 
an exercise where the bodily imagination plays a pivotal role.
The point is that inhabiting pain in this second sense, bearing witness to pain 
without succumbing to it, can engender an opening of the soul. Pain, in this sense, 
crosses a limit, beyond the paralysis of being, the impossibility of movement; it 
transforms. Such an opening onto death as a way of “seeing” and “tasting” (al-
Ghazali) is a different modality of melancholy from the closing up of the horizon, 
the generalization of the death drive in the affliction of soul choking. Inhabiting 
pain through the bodily imagination, connecting to others in that space, is both 
unbearable and expansive. And yet the two modalities are contiguous, and can 
never be completely set apart. The unbearable remains, can never be overcome. 
And the bereavement of acute melancholy always risks choking the soul, and 
making being inert. 
The possibility of ethical struggle is situated precisely in that tension, as a 
work of the imagination in a space of mourning, and in the proximity, and 
the engagement, with destruction and violence. It is an engagement that is not 
instrumental, remains unresolved, and cannot be reduced to an external telos, for 
the ethical work is the struggle itself. In this sense, perhaps, the Imam can tell us 
something about the temporality of a moment when the exits are not in view. 
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It would be haram law ana armala (a mercy for me if I were a widow), 
rather than to see my husband with all his afiato (physical well- being), 
unable to do anything.
Um Mohammad, 29 years old from the Shuja’iyya neighborhood
Believe me, I would accept my husband’s violence if he was actually a 
real man respected by his children and others. He does nothing useful 
for us and at the same time makes daily troubles against me and the 
children. He is also not respected by his family and kin.
Um Husam, 48 years old from Beach camp
These words from women in Gaza illustrate the high level of frustration of 
women in poor and vulnerable Gaza families towards their out-of-work husbands. 
Prolonged Israeli oppressive policies against Palestinians in Gaza, particularly since 
early 2006 when Hamas won the legislative election and took control over Gaza, 
have destroyed the formal and the informal economy of Gaza; as a consequence, 
most Gazan men lost their ability not only to provide for their families, but even to 
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maintain their masculine image in front of their wives and children.
The Palestinian socio-economic and political context clearly influences not 
only the practice of masculinity, but also its culturally opposite term, femininity. 
The events of the Second Intifada have dramatically weakened the material, 
social and psychological basis of both masculinity and femininity – a man is 
valueless and unable to secure his family, and a woman is humiliated by being 
forced to leave her children and her respected position as domesticated wife and 
mother, to act as a beggar for humanitarian aid in the public sphere. The crisis 
of femininity is not simply a by-product of the crisis in masculinity. Both are 
rather a consequence of the decomposition of the system of political economy, 
whereby the public and the domestic spheres have lost the structural basis for 
their functioning. Thus both men and women are victimized, as each lost the 
normative structural basis of gender enactment (Abu-Nahleh, 2006). 
This research paper will focus on one particular question: How is the 
current crisis of masculinity and femininity reflected in the presentation and 
representation of gendered selfhood? Exploring the answer to this question 
through qualitiative data and analysis of focus groups and in-depth interviews 
conducted in Beach Camp and the Shuja’iyya neighbourhood of Gaza city, also 
leads to an understanding why women and men resist challenging the ideology 
of male domination, despite the deep dislocation of the structural gender 
arrangements within the family and in the wider society. My window to the crisis 
of gendered identity during the prolonged period of the siege against Gaza will be 
the husband-wife relationship and the gendered presentation and interpretation 
of domestic violence. 
Across Generations
During the war and conflict situations in contemporary Palestinian society 
before the Second Intifada, while many men were sacrificing for the liberation of 
their nation, their women acted as the main sustainer of the family – and hence 
the nation, constituting the moral aspects of femine and masculine selfhood. 
(Massad, 1995, Peteet 1994, Johnson and Kuttab 2001). Thus, domestic, roles 
and responsibilities were never devalued by women because they were seen to 
serve the wider national goal of liberation. 
In the context of gender relations within the family, women strive to present 
the masculinity of their men as consistent with the moral image of masculinity, 
regardless of the actual practices of gender within the family. For example, my 
historical analysis of intra-family gender relations under the Israeli occupation 
shows that most women in Gaza, across generations, presented their dissatisfaction 
and unhappiness to live with powerless husbands who are socially stigmatized 
as mahkomeen, controlled whether by their mothers or by their wives. This, for 
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women, undermines their moral sense of femininity. I argue that this form of 
representation among women - who suffer not only from the joblessness of their 
husbands during the Second Intifada but also from husbands whose income 
and decisions were controlled by mothers, fathers or older brothers during their 
absence in the Israeli labour market before the full closure of Gaza borders - is a 
dynamic used by women themselves to balance, as argued by Henrietta Moore 
the fantasy of masculine identity with the fantasy of their power and agency 
(Moore 1994: 66). In the situation when the material sources of the gender order 
decompose, women as well as men develop symbolic presentational dynamics 
aimed at stabilizing the gender order and its symbolic meaning of masculinity 
and femininity.1 Two main interlinked elements played a critical role in the the 
process of women’s wielding of power within the household and in the local 
community in Gaza: women’s life cycles and the changing socio-economic and 
political structures in the historical context of Gaza society. 
Throughout a woman’s life cycle and across generations in the Gaza society, 
women contributed to the reproduction of the extended household, as a strategy 
to wield personal power through their position as wives and mothers. The first 
generation of married women in the post-1948 period was dominated by men 
(fathers and husbands) were who were physically present around the household, 
and controlled the production of household resources and public decisions, 
although women participated in agricultural production. Older women practiced 
their power, as the transmitter of the family’s wealth and honour, through family 
and kin relations, and through the arrangements of kin marriage. This was the 
stereotypical form of gender relations in the patriarchal traditional peasant family 
in Gaza before the Israeli occupation (Rosenfeld, 1960 & 1968). 
The second generation of married women were the wives of the wage labourers 
in Israel who became more dominated by older women rather than by their 
absent men. The older women (the mothers-in-law) at this period (1970s till into 
the late 1980s) acquired social authority from their men to replace them during 
their absence in Israel. This form of household gender relations weakened the 
patriarchal traditional structure of Gaza household, even though the image of 
patriarchy remained a dominant discourse in the society. 
The third generation of women is the mothers of the growing children of 
today, who mostly married in the early to mid-1990s. For them, the early phases of 
marriage witnessed the relative political and economic stability of the Gaza society 
that followed the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. It appears that the 
third generation of women - the housewives - continued to be domesticated, but 
also enjoyed higher levels of autonomy compared with other historical periods. 
This autonomy was largely achieved by the nucleation of households – where 
1 See my thesis, chapter 3 on ‘Family Structure and Gender Relations in Gaza under the Israeli 
occupation’ (83-134). 
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women attempted to exercise control over their children and family unit – which 
largely took place under the Palestinian Authority in the period 1993-2000. This 
group of women were reliant on their husbands’ income as the only source of 
livelihood. 
We will see below how the economic crisis of masculinity and the moral 
crisis of femininity in Gaza family – losing their self-respect as a domesticated 
respected wife and mother ‘musatata’ – are presented by both women and men in 
order to maintain a meaning for their social existence, while the other economic 
and social meanings of gender identity are distorted. 
Husband-Wife Dynamics: Between Tolerance and Violence
The inability of men to challenge the material aspects of their masculinity crisis is 
reflected in two contradictory behavioural dynamics: either by being sympathetic 
husbands, cooperating with their wives for the household’s survival, or by being 
violent, careless and passive. The former group of men appreciate what their wives 
do to provide for and to protect the family, and they act with them in a tolerant 
way. Those men believe that the provision of the family is their gendered social and 
moral obligation that is structurally restricted by the closure of the borders and 
the destruction of the Gaza economy. Nevertheless, those cooperative husbands 
admit during the focus groups discussions that what their wives do to provide 
for the family is a feminine domain that cannot be undertaken by men. The 
latter group, as presented by women interviewees, responds to the crisis of their 
masculinity by acting unsympathetically, especially those who live in extended 
families. This includes being more violent with wives, leaving home for long 
hours, not providing any childcare and relying on the extended family members 
to support wives with childcare and in some cases, practicing control over the rare 
sources of income or aid that wives collect for the survival of the family. Those 
men became more violent, mostly against their children. 
The impact on husband-wife relations of the Second Intifada is characterized 
by high levels of diversity. Younger husbands who live with extended families 
are, for example, less cooperative with their wives than middle aged husbands. 
Younger husbands feel secure in not being cooperative at home because they 
rely on their mothers or sisters. Middle age men, both in Shuja’iyya and in the 
Beach camp, with less education, are more tolerant and cooperative than young 
educated men. Young men with better education seem to find find it hard to 
accept and to cope with their wives acting as the primary provider. 
A husbands’ health status also appears as an influencing factor in wives’ 
presentation of their husbands as cooperative. A husband’s sickness may not be 
serious, but it may be symbolically used by women to justify their husband’s 
helplessness. Wives’ presentation of their sick husbands as cooperative and 
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tolerant, also enhances the women’s moral sense of femininity, as they sacrifice for 
their married life and children. Men, on the other hand, present their sickness as a 
reason for their cooperation with their wives, in a way to justify their helplessness 
in family provision. 
Cooperative Husbands 
The empirical data shows a remarkable number of young and middle aged wives 
(ages 20 to 39) who admitted that their husbands have became more cooperative 
and tolerant with them since the husbands became jobless. They are 6 out of 15 
women in the Beach camp, and 7 out of 16 women of similar age in Shuja’iyya. 
Most of the 13 women with cooperative husbands live in nuclear households or 
households that are separate but attached to the husbands’ parents. One possible 
interpretation of why wife-husband relations are more cooperative in nuclear 
households is that men are more encouraged to cooperate with their wives, if their 
cooperation is not visible by other family members (mothers and adult brothers). 
I tried to compare husbands’ and wives’ presentations of the meaning of 
husbands’ cooperation. Some women affirmed that a husband’s tolerance and 
cooperation is situational and their husbands are not happy with how they 
behave. Husbands, as women describe it, feel compassion for their wives who 
humiliate themselves by moving around searching for coupons, while husbands 
cannot handle this task. A number of young wives attribute the cooperative and 
tolerant characteristics of their husbands to them being sick. The largest group 
presents the cooperation of their husbands as a response to wives’ appreciation 
of their husbands’ manliness, enhancing their masculinity and not making them 
feel down or inferior for not earning income. Only three women mentioned that 
their husbands’ cooperation is a sign of recognition and valuation of their wives’ 
important and respected role in family survival. 
Women’s presentations of their husbands’ cooperation reflect the interplay of 
the crisis of femininity with the crisis of masculinity. Women try to emphasize 
that their husbands’ cooperation does not undermine their manliness, and 
is not in contradiction with their domestic authority. This discourse used by 
women enhances their sense of femininity, by which they maintain themselves as 
respected wives, despite their mobility searching for livelihood sources. They also 
refer their husbands’ cooperation to the moral aspect of an ideal wife who stands 
beside her husband in hard times, and does not make him feel down. Samia, in 
her mid-30s and living in a nuclear family, presents her husband’s tolerance and 
cooperation by saying: 
 
Despite all I do, the final decisions are still taken by him in consultation 
with me. The man is the man and the woman is a woman…should we 
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reduce his value because he becomes jobless? Money is not everything, 
if he does not work today, he will work tomorrow. That he is around 
for me and the children is enough. He treats me well. He has never 
beaten me since he became jobless. He shouts a lot but I know how to 
calm him down.
Samia presents her husband as cooperative and tolerant. She does not allow him 
to do anything at home in order not to make him feel inferior. This technique 
made her husband very calm and very tolerant with her. He trusts her and since 
he lost his job, he has never prevented her from going out. Salwa, 35 years old 
from Shuja’iyya said:
My husband is actually not happy to see me leaving home three to four 
times a week to look for coupons. He tried in the beginning to prevent me, 
and when I asked him to go out to look for work, he stopped interfering 
in my mobility. I told him: do you think I am happy with this shahtata, 
humiliation, or do you think I want to leave home to have fun? Then I 
cried. He felt sympathetic towards me and he calmed down because he 
realized that he is not able to do anything for the family. 
Awatif (29 years old), Manal (32 years old) and Randa (35 years old) are 
housewives from Shuja’iyya. They all asserted that their husbands became 
tolerant and cooperative after they got sick. As it is mentioned earlier, many men 
got physically and mentally sick from their prolonged joblessness. These women 
consider the cooperative stance of their husbands is a result of their physical 
powerlessness and their inability to do any work, even if it is available. They don’t 
expect they would be cooperative if they were able-bodied
Men realized their crisis of masculinity not only by the lack of jobs available, 
but also by their inability to work and/or to manage their household. They try 
to hide this crisis by avoiding contestation with their wives. This is explained by 
Awatif: ‘my husband avoids any encounter with me that may make me scandalize 
him as a useless husband’; 
Husbands use their sickness, as a legitimate social reason to justify their subjective 
weakness. This makes them leave all family decisions to be controlled by wives. 
Both women and men, however, describe this relation as cooperative in order to 
romanticise the husband-wife relationship, and to hide the negative psychological 
effect of the masculinity crisis. Men are given a legitimacy not to act their socially 
constructed gender, because they are sick, and women are valued as they self-
sacrifice for their family headed by a sick husband. 
None of these responses evaluate the changes in gender relations as positive, 
or as transformative. Um Husam from the Beach camp is 32 years old, and she is 
the only wife interviewed who presents the current changes in her relation with 
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her husband as transformative. She says: “... Even if my husband goes back to work 
and earns income, I am not going back to my previous life, just satisfying the master 
of the family. I feel now what freedom means.” 
Men, on the other hand, present their cooperation with their wives very 
carefully in order not to be perceived as diminishing their masculinity. In men’s 
focus groups, most men presented their cooperative enactment as being situational 
as well as moral. They tried to challenge their helplessness by providing moral 
support to their wives who also feel victimized by their husbands’ joblessness. 
However, men insist in their self-presentations that their helplessness in family 
provision is not personal, but purely situational. In a focus group with men in the 
Beach camp, Abu Hasan, 29 years old with 6 children, formerly worked in fishing 
and his wife used to help him from home. He asserts that his wife never left home 
to visit associations before the Intifada, but he has to encourage her now to search 
for coupons because there are no other options for living. Abu Hasan presents 
himself as a cooperative husband by not interfering in his wife’s mobility or in 
managing the family expenses. He said: 
My wife doesn’t do anything wrong by leaving home to search for 
coupons while we (men) are unable to earn income. I would not let her 
to leave home and to humiliate herself in a normal situation, but what 
can we do. El umour mesh be Idna, things are not in our control.
I asked Abu Hasan about what he is doing while his wife goes out to search for 
coupons. He replied: 
I in fact don’t do anything at home. I do not really want my mother, 
sisters and wife to see me at home doing nothing. I leave home during 
the day, but I feel secure about the family because my mother and sisters 
are there with the children. If I stay at home, I would shout and maybe 
beat my children. So it’s better to leave home. I spend my day with my 
friends: we play cards and chat.
  
Other men in the focus group support Abu Hasan, and one said: ‘yes, we (men) 
all avoid staying at home to control our behaviours with the children and wives’. 
Another critical point in the analysis of men’s cooperation is men’s realization of the 
importance of women’s bargaining skills, which the men are unable to or cannot 
develop during situations of scarcity. Women learned bargaining from an early age 
through intergenerational relations within their families. Jobless husbands know 
that their wives have to present themselves as inferior and docile in order to receive 
humanitarian assistance. Husbands also know that their wives have to present their 
husbands as helpless and unable to feed the family. With the absence of any other 
sources of survival, men accept that women have to act in ways that undermine 
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their sense of femininity in order for their families to survive. This is also recognized 
by women because they believe that it is only women who can bargain and deceive, 
not men. In this context, inferiority and superiority is instrumentally negotiated, 
by which the socially and historically constructed concept of inferiority, attached 
to women, is used intentionally to accomplish the purpose of household’s survival. 
This is openly expressed by Awatif and mentioned by many other women in the 
focus groups:
Men can’t do what we do. Men are in general very straightforward in 
their communication and negotiation with the outside world. This is 
not worthy in the current situation of scarcity we live in. We women 
are mudardahat, subtle. We give each the proper speech that fits him 
or her. We don’t care if we speak with someone from Hamas or Fatah, 
unless they meet our purpose of assistance. We are not rigid and we are 
very patient.
It is noted that men’s presentation of their cooperation with their wives is 
paradoxical. They explicitly and implicitly assert that what their wives do is 
inferior, and it is only done by women. At the same time, they present their wives 
as dedicated, self-sacrificing and deliberate. Most men confirmed that their wives 
try to meet their children’s demands without letting the men know, in order 
to avoid their anger and to maintain peace within the family. This discourse of 
presentation by men has structural and subjective implications. They first try to 
assert that their helplessness in family provision is not caused by their lack of 
manliness, but it is rather caused by structural constraints out of their control. 
Second, they try to emphasize that despite their joblessness and helplessness, 
wives still respect and appreciate them, and do not transcend the image of male 
domination. A middle-aged man, who had worked in Israel as a contractor, 
expressed the political and moral effect of the Second Intifada on husband-wife 
relations, by saying:
What is happening with us as men has never been imagined. Does 
anyone of us expect marato el musatata, his respected wife, to be a 
beggar for a coupon? We used to see women of our mothers’ age trading 
in the market, we used to accept our wives to go out to do shopping for 
themselves and for the children; we also used to accept our wives to go 
out to work as teachers and nurses. But we have never expected them to 
humiliate themselves for a coupon. But neswana, our wives, are really 
deliberate and they deserve respect. They do not even let us feel bad 
about ourselves. They bear this burden because they know that it is 
not lack of manliness not to earn income, but it is the closure which is 
out of our control. The international humanitarian aid turns us to be 
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beggars. They don’t know that this would not affect our morals as men 
and women. This situation is not staying forever, then we will be back to 
work and our wives will be back to their respected norm of life, looking 
after their children and husbands.
As this material makes clear, the new cooperation that men offer to their wives 
is limited and symbolic. The change in the gender division of labour during the 
livelihood crisis has not affected men’s and women’s perception of their masculinity 
and femininity. Only two women, for example, mentioned that their husbands 
share in domestic work, and those live in nuclear families. In contrast, men and 
women, as it appears in the narrations, try to enhance the different gendered 
image of each other. Men’s tolerance and cooperation is a symbolic discourse used 
by both men and women to meet the challenge of the crisis of masculinity and 
femininity, and to re-stabilize their gendered image. This argument is supported 
by many wives’ determination not to let their husbands share in the domestic 
work or in teaching the children, instead only wanting their husbands to keep 
calm and to be kind to them. Wives also do not want their husbands to lose their 
manliness in the public sphere by staying at home. 
Violent and Despondent Husbands
The common characters of the husbands described as violent by their wives, are 
laziness, passivity, selfishness and carelessness. With the absence of male sources of 
livelihood and the social legitimacy of married young wives’ mobility to search for 
means for their children’s survival, many men have left the household livelihood 
burden on women’s shoulders without interfering positively or negatively. This 
reflects men’s realization that the only source of survival available, at their current 
time, is the ‘inferior’ tasks women do. Both cooperative and violent men respond 
in reactionary ways to their crisis of masculinity, according to the interviewed 
women. It appears that those men who were deemed powerful in the established 
hierarchy due to their employment and education before the Second Intifada, 
and who were more bonded with the established patriarchal norms and practices, 
became more violent with their family members. 
The violent reaction of husbands is more common among husbands who 
formerly had permanent jobs as skilled labourers in Israel for many years. The 
power of those husbands was mainly shaped by their ability to earn good income 
from their work in Israel. The wives of these husbands complained about their 
husbands’ refusals to accept low-income jobs available through the job creation 
programs offered by international agencies. These jobs are seen by husbands as 
humiliating, due to their low wages and low status. Wives who used to live in better 
situations before the Second Intifada mostly described their jobless husbands as 
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becoming more violent. As described by wives, their husbands cannot forget that 
they have become jobless after they have been earning so much they could ‘play 
with money’. Other groups of women who described their husbands as violent are 
the wives of highly educated husbands who are university graduates. 
The majority of women who face violence today are wives who did not 
experience violence from their husbands before the Intifada. Most of these 
women are in their early thirties and they give as excuses for their husbands 
being violent, that their joblessness and helplessness are nafsian, psychologically, 
unbearable. Only three women who experienced violence from their husbands 
throughout their marriage life utilized the male-bread winner crisis to build 
up their power to resist their husbands’ violence. Young married women suffer 
more from their husbands’ violence than middle aged married women. This is 
explained by some wives by the fact that middle aged women rely to some extent 
on their teenage sons to earn some income and to protect themselves from their 
husbands’ violence. Young married women’s children are very young and helpless. 
It is important to note that the husbands’ violence does not affect wives’ 
mobility to search for coupons, or other sources of family survival. Wives’ access 
to mobility to search for livelihood sources helps them to protect themselves from 
their husbands’ violence, by not demanding anything from their husbands and 
by managing their daily household basic needs by themselves. This argument is 
supported by many wives who say that their husbands mainly become violent 
when any member of the family demands money. Women therefore prefer their 
husbands to stay outside the home for longer hours to avoid any demands from 
children and wives, and as a result, avoid tension and violence. 
The discussion and analysis during the individual interviews as well as the focus 
groups with both men and women also suggest that wives who live in nuclear 
families are less safe from violence than those who live in an extended family. 
Almost all women emphasized that their husbands’ violence is a by-product of 
their feeling of helplessness, and the loss of their sense of manhood. Violence 
by husbands is mostly reflected in insulting and shouting with less physical 
violence. The verbal violence is continuous—reflecting the ongoing frustration 
and depressing mood of jobless husbands. Violence is mostly practiced against 
children, more than wives. This is explained by some wives by saying that jobless 
husbands feel embarrassed to treat their wives, who feed them and their children, 
violently. Husbands, as a result, express their anger and frustration against their 
children (young and teenage), assuming that the children are morally obliged to 
bear their fathers’ violence. Women who were hit by their husbands mentioned 
that they were hit while trying to protect their children from their fathers. 
Except for a few cases of women who tried to resist their husbands’ violence, 
the majority of wives justified their husbands’ violence and tried to endure it for 
the sake of the stability of their children’s lives and not to live in daily tension. 
Women perceive their husbands’ violence as not being a matter of gender, and 
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they repeatedly present it as behaviour conditioned by the husbands’ joblessness. 
Amira is 37 years old with 6 children. Her married life has been a misery because 
she has been oppressed by both her mother-in-law and her husband. Amira’s 
mother-in-law became calm at the time of her son’s joblessness and she stopped 
interfering in her mobility, but her husband became more violent. Amira 
attributes her husband’s violence to his joblessness, which makes her unhappy 
with what she has to do. She says at the end of her interview:
I pray day and night for my husband to find a job, and for me to go back 
home and to stop going out. Whatever I brought to feed my children, my 
husband steals it to buy his cigarettes. He doesn’t care about his children. 
He sometimes beats me if I come from outside without anything is hand. 
If he worked, he would not be violent with me.
Hala, 30 years old from Shuja’iyya, tells:
If I stop going out to bring coupons, my children would not find food to 
eat. My husband is a university graduate and he was working in Israel. 
Our relationship was calm before the closure. Since my husband lost his 
job, he has become careless and violent. He shouts against his children 
for no reason. I understand this and I try to absorb his anger. I asked 
all my children not to demand anything from their father in order to 
avoid his violence. I don’t know what to do with him. If I shout at him, 
all his family will blame me. So I try to stay silent till he calms down. 
Although some of the wives interviewed said that their husbands practiced 
violence against them before their joblessness, almost all of them consciously or 
unconsciously ignored the historical gender aspect of male domestic violence. It 
appears that violence against women was natural or normal before joblessness, 
while the current violence is situational. Wives’ justification of justification their 
husbands’ violence due to joblessness can probably be interpreted psychologically. 
This would entail linking women’s interests and desires towards maintaining the 
symbolic image of their husband’s masculinity when men have lost the structural 
sources of masculinity through the destruction of the socio-economic and 
political system. There are other structural reasons why women intentionally 
accommodate their husbands’ violence: 1) the diminishing of the effect of informal 
social support systems based on family and kin relations, by which women do not 
have anywhere to go in case of their husbands’ violence (Johnson, 2006); b) the 
deinstitutionalization of the Gaza society and the absence of the enforcement of 
law (IWS, 2008). A third moral subjective reason is that if women in a situation 
of masculinity crisis resist their husbands’ violence, they are scandalized as bad 
wives, who do not stand beside their husbands during their crisis. Women in this 
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context do not want to lose everything, at least, do not want to lose the symbolic 
gender image of being a good wife. 
Crises in Representation
The empirical analysis of husband-wife relation during the second Intifada asserts 
that in a war and scarcity situation, masculinity and femininity are negotiated 
more than contested among poor and vulnerable people - men and women - who 
have lost their actual sources of economic and social power in order to maintain a 
meaning for their selfhood. For men to be more violent (symbolic or real violence) 
or to be tolerant, and for women to justify their husbands’ violence are all “…a sign 
of a struggle for the maintenance of certain fantasies of identity and power” (Moore, 
1994:70). Gender or non-gender-based violence, as Henrietta Moore argues, is a 
result of the subject’s crisis of representation, both individual and social, and it is a 
means to resolve this crisis (ibid: 69). Violence against women, within this analysis, 
is not by itself the threat. The actual threat is the conditions that deprive both 
men and women to properly present themselves, in a way that maintains their self-
respect and human dignity regardless of the changing gender roles. 
Within the specific context of war and conflict in the Gaza society, I disagree 
with the mainstream feminist discourse that still analyzes domestic violence as 
simply and universally a manifestation of male domination and patriarchy. Liz 
Kelly for example argued that gender-based violence against women is ‘one of the 
most extreme and effective forms of patriarchal control, which simultaneously 
damages and constrains women’s lives’ (Kelly 2000:45). This argumentation is not 
relevant to the Gaza context, especially during the second Intifada. My research 
findings show that male violence against women is not a form of patriarchal 
control, and it does not constraint women to practice their agency. Men’s violence 
against women in Gaza during the current crisis is rather a reflection that the 
perpetrator of violence – jobless and helpless men- is threatened and experiences 
thwarting or frustration (Moore 1994:67). 
Women’s narrations in my research reveal that, in arelatively stable situation 
under the prevailing gender order, men were less violent against their women 
because they were properly able to sustain their willing masculine subject in 
relation to women’s practice of their willing feminine subject. In this context, 
there is no reason for men to practice violence against women because they both 
negotiate domination and subordination, as it is socially constructed, to achieve 
their personal and familial goals. 
My argument does not deny that male violence against women in the Gazan 
family, especially in the war situation, harms or damages women’s selfhood, but 
we have also to admit that the emasculation of women’s male intimates is also 
harmful for both men and women, while women in Gaza may still present their 
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gendered selfhood to others. In this specific context, even if women had the 
agentive capacity to resist the violence practiced against them by their powerless 
husbands, they would be reluctant to do so because women in Gaza still perceive 
their self-sacrifice and endurance of hardship for the sake of others, including 
those who have historically subordinated them, as a distinctive moral constituent 
of their femininity. Although Gaza poor housewives contribute to the persistence 
of the ideology of male domination, they also give a model of women’s agency 
that resists the colonial forces distortion of the moral aspects of the Palestinian 
subject, a male and female. This is illustrated in women’s enhancement of their 
distinctive moral feminine subject as reproducers of care and love, which rescues 
the meaning of Gaza family, as a connected and collective unit, from being lost.
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Crime, Gender and Punishment:  
The Paradox of Palestinian Civil Policing
Penny Johnson
In her conference presentation, Penny Johnson reflects on 
how Palestinian civil policing could occur in a context where 
Israeli colonialism does not acknowledge civilians and where 
Palestinian civil policing is both embedded in larger security 
structures and neglected in resource allocation. She considers 
events at the 2009 Nablus Shopping Festival in the light of 
oppositions between normality and resistance, and raises the 
question of whether policing is producing gendered categories 
of crime. Penny Johnson is the English-language editor of the 
Review of Women’s Studies.
Among the over 200 Palestinians killed in Gaza during Israel’s first wave of air 
strikes on 27 December 2008, were 42 police recruits standing in formation for 
their graduation ceremony. In a 31 December letter raising concerns about the 
Israeli army’s “targeting of civilian objects in the Gaza Strip,” the Israeli human 
rights organization B’Tselem noted that:
Participants in the course study first-aid, handling of public 
disturbances, human rights, public safety exercises and so forth. 
(B’Tselem 2008)
Although international humanitarian law and the laws of war (where the 
civil police are considered as separate from the army) would clearly distinguish 
these trainees as non-combatants and “civilian objects,” the Israeli army treated 
them as military targets – as was the case with the Palestinian police in a number 
of incidents during Israel’s 2002 incursion into West Bank towns. Indeed, in 
the context of Gaza, this is consistent with Israel’s treatment of almost all male 
Palestinian deaths as militants. As was later revealed in the Israeli press, the 
bombing of the Gaza police graduation was planned months before and was 
“internally criticized” but then the IDF’s international law division finally gave 
the go-ahead (Feldman and Blau 2009)
This tragic incident immediately raises a question on the paradox of Palestinian 
civil policing: can there be Palestinian civil policing when Israeli violence does 
not distinguish “civilian objects”? We are forcefully reminded that external and 
internal violence are not separate categories but that, in Talal Asad’s useful phrase, 
there is a “historical space in which violence circulates,” (Asad 2007, 15) That 
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space in our context is clearly colonial. This is somewhat obliquely acknowledged 
in the Palestinian National Authority’s 2008-2010 Palestinian Reform and 
Development Plan that sets the policies for Palestinian security reform. It is:
“our responsibility, within the limits placed on the Palestinian 
security forces by Israel’s occupation, for bringing the rule of law 
to the occupied territory and combating violence” (PNA 2007, 7) 
[emphasis mine]
If the limits placed by the Israeli occupation are a clear statement of colonial 
effects, there is a more ambiguous colonial subtext in the emphasis on “combating 
violence,” which, in one meaning, echoes the role of the Palestinian police as 
defined in the Oslo accords as protecting Israeli security and preventing Palestinian 
violence against Israel. As Lia, a Norwegian security expert who has written two 
volumes on Palestinian policing, aptly noted:
“a fundamental anomaly in Palestinian policing in that the 
Palestinian Police’s main duties, according to the signed [Oslo] 
agreements, was the protection of Israeli security and colonial 
interests in the Occupied Territories.” (Lia 2007, 3)
At the same time, Palestinian women, men and children need – and even demand 
– safety and security in their communities, the prevention of crime, and the 
prosecution of criminals. Indeed, this demand is heightened by the colonial 
violence that surrounds it and has been more clearly voiced since the internal 
violence of 2006 and 2007 and in the widely circulated discourse of falataan amni 
[security chaos]. Herein lies one aspect of the paradox of Palestinian civil policing 
which aims to produce normality (ie public order) in highly abnormal conditions. 
But we have another question: can Palestinian policing be civil when it is 
embedded in larger security structures and the politics of security? The Authority’s 
security plan included the goal of reducing the previous multiplicity of security 
services (at twelve or more) to “three branches that deliver high quality policing, 
national security and intelligence services.” (PNA 2007, 12). The plan thus 
promises to distinguish the “civil police” from both the national and general 
intelligence services. In fact, the situation on the ground, where at least six 
services operate today is much more complex (indeed a better word is messy).
These services are accountable to various formal and informal parties within the 
PA and outside it, including US Security coordinator General Keith Dayton, 
who trained the Presidential Guard and oversees the training of the National 
Security Forces, a proto-army gendarmerie. Fortunately mapping these intricate 
relations of power is not my focus but I would like to raise three points, that relate 
to civil policing.
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1) Although under different authorities, civil policing (under the Minister of 
Interior) works with and seems to be sometimes under the command of the 
National Security Forces (under the Prime Minister and General Dayton) 
when it comes to missions such as curbing militias, or even organized crime. 
2) Under the same umbrella of a rather weak Ministry of Interior, preventive 
security and civil policing are living uneasily together in more than an 
administrative grouping and perhaps less than a partnership. A police 
criminal investigator in the southern West Bank who scrupulously follows 
police procedure (even though one of his manuals is in Chinese!) nonetheless 
acknowledged to researchers at the Institute of Women’s Studies that 
“preventive security was useful for doing things the police cannot do.”1 
While he was referring here to the (perhaps violent) interrogation of suspects, 
another thing the police cannot do (which plainclothes preventive security 
can sometimes do) is move freely in Areas B and C in the West Bank.2 As a 
NSF commander remarked in an interview: 
All the criminals and wanted persons just move to B or go to the hills 
in Area C. All law violators can escape. The Israelis are concerned 
only about one thing – Israeli security – and not about Palestinian 
security. 
 And of course Palestinian policing cannot combat the cause of the majority 
of crimes committed against Palestinians, acts by the Israeli army or settlers, 
from murder to the destruction of property. It is also worth considering if this 
overall lack of control shapes policing attitudes to spaces and persons that can 
be controlled.
3) The goal of three clear branches of policing and security is complicated also 
by another triangulation between Palestinian Authority goals, donor interests, 
and Israel’s power. While the US took on “hard” security, the EU was 
mandated to take care of “soft” security via support of the civil police. The huge 
imbalance in power and resources between the hard and soft security sectors is 
gendered in the sense that the focus of hard security on curbing, assimilating 
or arresting young male militants is, in budget, policy and practice, at the 
expense of initiatives for the civilian population. Thus, the civil police, with 
1 The two interviews cited with police and security officers do not include dates or names to 
protect the anonymity of the interviewees.
2 Since this interview, there seems to be some uneasy improvement in “security coordination” 
in the West Bank probably for reasons of pursuing offenders against Israeli security, but also 
including pursuing local criminal suspects.
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the urging of the EU, instituted a potentially important Unit for Family and 
Child Protection – but to date its resources are painfully limited and there is 
only one unit operating to date (in the Bethlehem district).
Of signal importance, the security services’ crackdown on militants, especially 
given dependency on American and Israeli power, counterposes both in the 
public mind and in practice resistance and normality as opposites, with a number 
of negative consequences for civil life and civil order. Consider an incident at the 
July 2009 Nablus Shopping Festival – a minor event, one could say, albeit with a 
major knafeh (Nabulsi cheese pastry yes, the largest in the world), and a “local” civil 
event which intersected some of the world’s most powerful forces. The Festival, 
inaugurated by Prime Minister Fayyad (and with President Abbas lighting a torch 
for it at Arafat’s grave) was slated as the “culminiation of development initiatives 
from the international community as well as the fruition of ongoing efforts under 
US Major General Keith Dayton.” An estimated 500 members of the National 
Security Force, as well as the police, were deployed in Nablus for the week-long 
festival. Responding to requests from Dayton, Israel eases restrictions at the 
Huwwara checkpoint and other points of entry into Nablus.
And then, before dawn on 27 July, three masked Palestinian militants burned 
down the stage. Despite NSF and police presence in the area, there was no attempt 
to stop them. As one news agency noted, quoting official sources, “though local 
officers observed the crime, they were unable to pursue the arsonists because 
of existing security arrangements with Israel.” (Maan, 27 July 2009). These 
arrangements, it seems, forbade Palestinian police or security activity while Israeli 
forces were operating in the area. So one large strike against normality. But there 
were others – some analysts claim that the security forces “refused to stop Fatah 
operatives because of lack of orders from their commanders,” inferring both that 
there was some sympathy for the militants and that the commanders perhaps 
could not operate without Dayton, who was not in Nablus that morning.  So 
a second, more ambiguous, strike. And then, why did masked militants want 
to burn down the stage? This was likely an assertion that militants still control 
Nablus, but it was also a fiery statement that the situation was decidedly not 
normal, and that resistance would continue. Significantly for our concerns, the 
attack also had a culturalist dimension: hip-hop artists and other performers at 
the Festival, the militant act asserted, were not welcome in Nablus.
Here, political conflict over the control of Nablus becomes posed as resistance 
versus normality and then is expressed in cultural conflict. I would argue that 
this is a dynamic seen elsewhere in Palestine and one with disturbing gendered 
and generational implications. Policing public order is not a neutral activity: it 
defines both a public and a normative public order. The culturalist and gendered 
dimension of this can be seen most clearly in the initiatives for morality policing in 
Gaza today, where woman are banned from riding motorcycles and an unmarried 
rEviEW OF WOmEN STudiES  ArTiCLES  57
young man and woman may be stopped from riding together in a vehicle. The 
latest version is a March 2010 ban on men in salons cutting women’s hair. These 
versions of public order – ostensibly to protect women’s morality – may well in 
fact produce more violence as young women’s behavior becomes a question of 
public order and punishment for deviations whether by police, families or others 
is in itself a form of violence.
So back to our question in this very complex situation, can Palestinian policing 
be civil, and if so how is it operating? The culturalist examples above point to 
policing as shaping new forms of public order, rather than simply preserving 
existing order. As, our Norwegian security expert points out, in times of transition 
“the police often play a more autonomous role as an actor in shaping the social 
and political order.” (Lia 2006, 3). In the last four years, the separate civil police 
forces in the West Bank and Gaza have been extending their activities and are 
largely seen by the public as making the streets and the population safer. Yet 
those very streets can paradoxically again be seen as sites of growing moral danger. 
Participants in a focus group in Doha/Beit Jala agreed “The streets are not safe. The 
shebab have no morals because they have no responsibilities.”One mother said: 
I trust my daughter, she can say anything. She is 16 years old and 
I won’t let her outside. I am frightened for her. The shebab might 
talk badly to her. 
New forms of violence – here “bad talk” – circulate and a mother trusts her 
daughter but won’t allow her outside, another paradox of these times that 
challenges optimistic views of public order. 
But what about more conventional definitions of violent crimes? 
Gendered Crime
Let us briefly consider the most violent crime – violations of the right to life, 
here by Palestinian perpertrators. What are the leading causes of homicide 
and femicide in the last five years (since the re-introduction of police) and are 
homicide and femicide increasing? 
2007 stands out as the year of homicide – mainly male deaths – with the 
Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights recording 585 deaths (as opposed 
to 345 in 2006), of which 503 were in Gaza and 343 in Gaza the result of internal 
fighting. An overwhelming majority of all deaths, 65% were of young men aged 
19-35 (PICCR, 2008). The murder of women and girls did not rise so drastically 
at 45 deaths, although crimes registered as “honor” killings rose from 14 in 2006 
to 18 in 2007, a majority of which were in Gaza. In 2007, murder was gendered, 
but even more so for men than women.
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As internal fighting ebbed in the next two years, can we see more “normal” 
patterns of deadly crime and how are they gendered? A few points to consider:
Killings by Palestinian perpetrators rose from 191 cases in 2008 to 236 in 
2009; ane reason was a rise in internal fighting largely due to shoot-outs between 
police and security services and militants in incidents in Qalqilya and Gaza. 
While these deaths were all male, female deaths also increased from 19 to 29.
Thus, in the last two years, females are victims in roughly one in ten cases of 
killing by Palestinian perpetrators.
Killings of women “on the background of honor” – which have tended to be 
at 10-14 annually since statistics have been available – were significant cause of 
female in 2009 (9 deaths out of 29) although less so in 2008 (at a surprisingly low 
of 3 out of 19). Neither figure is as high as 2007 where such crimes accounted 
for 18 female deaths out of 45. In none of the last five years were honor crimes a 
majority cause of female deaths, although more than a word of caution is required 
here in considering how such crimes are registered or concealed. Most other 
female deaths are clustered in “mysterious or unknown circumstances” in 2008 
and 2009. Thus, the most obvious gendered aspect of femicides – so called honor 
crimes – is salient but not dominant.
For men, oddly enough, the gendered aspect is in some ways clearer. A 
leading, even majority cause of male deaths in the West Bank in 2008 and 2009 
falls under family feuds and revenge, where almost, but not all, deaths are male. 
Family feuds are also a significant cause of male deaths in Gaza but more men 
died from internal clashes and misuse of arms in 2009. Another highly gendered 
cause of death, especially in 2008, is tunnel deaths from lack of public safety 
where all deaths are male. 
What deserves our attention in these statistics is the surprising absence of 
homicides/femicides from more usual criminal motives, such as killings for 
economic reasons. Could our highly gendered categories conceal as well as reveal 
types and motives for crime? Certainly, one suspects that the categories may 
impose a reading of “family feud” sometimes when the victim of an ordinary crime 
for economic gain is a relative – making crime in a way a cultural phenomenon. 
This is also true, we know, of some crimes termed “honor” crimes when motives 
are inheritance or other motives of economic gain. More case by case research is 
needed to understand patterns of crime, gender and punishment in Palestinian 
society. But I raise a related question for investigation here whether Palestinian 
policing is not only pursuing criminals, but producing gendered categories of 
crime and punishment. Policing as a form of “organized suspicion” (Asad 2005, 
285) also promotes new forms of behavior and attitudes which configure a new 
public order.
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reporting Gaza  
Assessing Social Suffering, voicing Needs
“Humanitarian Crisis and Social Suffering in the Gaza Strip:  
An Initial Comparison Between Women and Men” 
Rita Giacaman
“Voicing the Needs of Women and Men in Gaza” 
Rema Hammami
•	 27 December 2008-18 January 2009. Israel’s twenty-three 
day high-tech war on the trapped Gazan population. 
•	 2006 to present: Thousands of days of Israeli siege (and 
counting) and blockade.
How does Israel’s prolonged state violence against the whole 
Gazan population—1.5 million women, men and children – 
affect, whether differentially or in common, women, men and 
children? Given the Israeli blockade of Gaza, the IWS conference 
experienced the painful absence of researchers and colleagues 
living in Gaza. However, along with two other conference papers 
focused on Gaza (Muhanna and Qazzaz, both in this volume) 
the IWS conference heard two important reports on research 
projects conducted “beyond the aftermath” of Israel’s December 
2008 - January 2010 war on Gaza. 
Dr. Rita Giacaman of the Institute of Community and Public 
Health (ICPH) presented “Humanitarian Crisis and Social 
Suffering in the Gaza Strip: An Initial Comparison Between 
Women and Men,” using findings from the ICPH’s survey of 
3017 Gazan households in June and July of 2009. The notion 
of social suffering is crucial, indeed central, as it allows us to 
move beyond the framework of humanitarian emergency with 
its nameless perpetrators and victims to look at the operations 
of power and the voices of the victims. “Social suffering results 
from what political, economic and institutional power does to 
people,” observes Kleiman, Das and Lock in their important 
series on the topic. As well as probing the direct effects of Israel’s 
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war, such as injury and displacement, the survey addressed the 
effects of sustained siege and the fears, insecurities and stresses 
of post-war times. In her presentation, Giacaman used female 
and male heads of households to explore gender differentials in 
the aftermath of war and the continuance of siege. While males 
were the majority of direct casualties during the 23 days of Israeli 
military operations, assessing post-war social suffering brings 
women into sharp focus.
Dr. Rema Hammami of the Institute of Women’s Studies 
presented and analyzed voices of women, men and young people 
from focus groups conducted in the context of a UNIFEM/UN 
Gender Task Force Household Survey of 1,100 households across 
Gaza in the first week of March 2009, with ten focus groups 
conducted in May 2009. Hammami was a research associate 
in the conduct and publicationof the survey as, Voicing the 
Needs of Women and Men in Gaza: Beyond the Aftermath 
of the 23 day Israeli military operations (UNIFEM 2009). 
She was also the principal author of Toward Gender Equality 
in Humanitarian Response: Addressing the Needs of Women 
and Men in Gaza: A guidebook for the humanitarian sector, 
(UNIFEM 2010) which analyzed the focus group results. 
Both Giacaman and Hammami looked beyond the immediate 
casualities of the war to the deeper, and sometimes gendered, 
consequences on on psycho-social health and well-being. Below 
are selected findings from their presentations.
“Humanitarian Crisis and Social Suffering:  
An Initial Comparison Between Women and Men”
Rita Giacaman
Overall findings: More stress, ill-being for female-headed households. A representative 
sample of 3017 households (1% of total households within the Gaza Strip) 
were visited, with a response rate of 97% or 3012 households. About 31% of 
individuals in the sample population – representing about 471877 people in the 
total population – were displaced during the war. 39% of homes were completely 
(1%) or partially (38%) destroyed and at the time of the survey 74% of damaged 
homes had not been repaired. 72% of households relied on food aid. Quality of 
life was rated as less than good (out of five categories from very good to very poor) 
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by half of the respondents compared with 39% during the period before the war. 
There were significant differences between male and female-headed households 
as explored below. Human suffering attributable to the siege at the time of the 
survey (92% of individuals), latest war (85%) and internal Palestinian fighting 
(83%) was rated as 8 or more on a scale of 1-10, and with no differences between 
male and female heads of households.
Heads of Households by sex and selected characteristics
House heads Men Women Scaled up for the Gaza Strip
Number 1201  (89.7% of total)
144  
(10.3% of total)
Mean age 39.34 52.57
Post Secondary 
education
28%  
of men
6.3%  
of women
Marital status
Married 98.9 21.7
Widowed 0.2 64.3
Outside  
the labor force 10.2 90.0
Standard of living
Poor by STL scale 12.7 22.1
Well off  
by STL scale 20.6 11
Reliance  
on food aid 69.4% 92.3
Disabled (at least 
one disability) 2.2 9.8
One or more 
chronic disease 10.7 40.6
Standard of Living, Disability, Chronic Disease: As many recent studies have noted, 
a majority of Gazan families fall under the poverty line as measured by income or 
daily expenditure. In order to understand the differential effects of immiseration, 
the ICPH survey constructed a Standard of Living Scale which allowed comparative 
measurement among households. More female headed households (22.1%) were 
poor by the Standard of Living Scale than male headed households (12.7%), 
whereas more male headed households (20.6%) were well-off than female headed 
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households (11%) Almost all (92.3%) of female-headed households relied on 
food aid, while about two-thirds (69.4%) of male headed households did so. 
Female headed households were about four times more likely to have a disabled 
or chronically-ill member, with 9.8% of these households registering at least 
one disability compared to 2.2% among male headed households, and a highly 
significant 40.6% registering or more chronic diseases compared to 10.7% among 
male headed households. In common with other studies in both the West Bank 
and Gaza, ICPH found that female-headed households were smaller than male 
headed households( with an average household size of 3.61 for females compared 
6.08 for males), with the female head most frequently a widow at 64.3% of 
female heads compared to 6% for male heads.
Quality of Life: 
While male and female headed households were quite similar (at 80% for male 
and 81%) for female in rating their quality of life as “less than good” during the 
war, more female headed households reported their quality of life as less than 
good before the war (46.9%) and after the war (65%). About 40% of male headed 
households (39.9%) reported their quality of life as “less than good” before the 
war and 53% currently (post-war). But as Giacaman stressed, both did not return 
to pre-war levels.
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Distress and Human Insecurity:
Distress scale - household heads by sex
Male heads  
(% of group)
Female heads  
(% of group)
Least distress 15.3 2.1
Low distress 38.1 32.2
Moderate distress 34.2 39.2
High distress 12.4 26.6
The ICPH survey asked a series of questions to household heads in order to 
gauge distress among respondents, such as “To what extent to do you feel unable 
to control the important things in your life? To cope? To what extent do you 
feel worried? Anxious? Lonely? Angry? Responses were calculated on a scale with 
almost half of respondents reporting moderate to high levels of stress. There 
were, however, strong differences between female and male headed households. 
Almost two-thirds of female heads (65.8%) reported moderate to high levels of 
stress, while slightly less of half of male heads (46.6%) did so. A fairly significant 
proportion of male heads (15.3%) reported the least distress, while a very small 
proportion of female heads (2.1%) did so.
Female and male headed households were closer in their overwhelming feelings 
of insecurity, fear and threat. Respondents were questioned on a range of fear and 
threats, from fear for themselves or their families in daily life, to fear of not being 
able to provide daily necessities, with 84.6% of male heads reporting moderate 
to high insecurity and 81.2% of female heads. More male headed households at 
42.8% reported high levels of insecurity, as opposed to 34.3% of female-headed 
households.
Giacaman ended her presentation by noting that “despite this extreme 
violation, the large majority reported an increase in social solidarity – both family 
and community solidarity –from the onset of the war till the time of the survey 
compared to the period before the war. This is another reminder of the resilience 
of the Palestinian people.” 
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“Voicing the Needs of Women and Men in Gaza” 
Rema Hammami
Overall context: The recent 23 day military bombardment by Israel exemplifies 
the extent to which Gazan men, women and children suffer from a profound and 
comprehensive lack of protection. The war led to the death of 1,366 people (of 
whom 430 were children, 111 women) as well as the injury of over 5,380 people 
(including 1,870 children and 800 women). The Israeli military offensive also led 
to large-scale internal displacement of civilians. This was made more traumatic by 
the fact that civilians could neither leave the field of war, nor find secure and safe 
haven within it from aerial bombardment, even in United Nations installations. 
However, the war should be seen in some sense as the culmination of a much 
longer and systemic context of violence that Gazans have lived in. Physical 
insecurity, lack of ability to protect one’s family, lack of access to basic rights 
of movement (even for critical medical cases), vulnerability to internal violence, 
added to deep economic crisis are the dominant experience of all Gazans for 
almost a decade.
At the same time the causes, experiences of, and vulnerability to human rights 
violations and abuse are multi-layered. All Gazans regardless of age, gender or 
socio-economic status collectively suffer the effects of violations generated by 
external (albeit responsible) actors such as siege, sanctions, and military violence 
at the hands of the government of Israel. Within Gaza, however individuals are 
differentially vulnerable to a range of violations generated by internal actors. 
Rights can and often are violated due to reasons of political affiliation, gender, 
age, poverty and family or clan membership. Violators of rights can include, 
governmental authorities and their allied institutions (including everything from 
ministries, courts, the police, medical and educational staff); paramilitaries; local 
informal leaders; the extended family; individual family members and finally – 
humanitarian actors and organizations.
Both publications from this project are available on-line from UNIFEM so 
below are highlighted one specific issue – war widows and their children – and 
voices from the focus groups that explicate the transference of the violence of war 
and siege to the next generation, children.
Protection Issues Facing War Widows and their Children 
I have a problem with my husband’s family, his brothers went and 
wrote down our name to get assistance and they collect and keep all 
the money that should be for the wives and children of martyrs…
Everytime there’s some help that comes, my husband’s family takes 
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it. I even hid my husband’s car to keep it for my kids when they get 
older – but they found it and took it.
Abir, war widow, age 35 and mother of, five children
My father-in-law takes my husband’s pension, he got people to put 
pressure on me to write him down as my executor, its 600 (US) and 
he only gives me and my children $100 of it. On top of it, he and 
my husband’s family take all the other assistance that we’re supposed 
to get that charities give to wives of martyrs and their children.
Fathiyyeh age 58, war widow and mother of ten children
My father-in-law takes all of the money that’s supposed to come 
to me and my children and gives us only 100 shekels a week, 100 
shekels can’t begin to cover our needs…When assistance comes for 
us he makes sure he escorts me to the bank and after I’ve signed all 
the papers he takes the money and puts it in his pocket. I can’t do 
anything about it, I’m scared from problems and scandal and more 
than anything I keep quiet so that I can keep custody of my children 
– they never stop threatening that they can take my children from 
me at any moment. My husband had a small shop, his family sold it 
and pocketed the money – my husband and I had sold all my gold 
to but that shop and now his family have taken everything.
Asma, age 26, war widow and mother of five children
The Israeli military action has created more than 800 new widows who along with 
their children face a range of new protection issues and challenges. Culturally 
and politically, war widows and orphans are extended formal material and moral 
support from political groups and the governing authorities, as well as informal 
support from the society at large. At the same time, in the extremely resource 
poor environment of Gaza, they are vulnerable to many of the same challenges 
faced by divorced women in terms of access to family property and child custody. 
The majority of war widows interviewed in focus groups faced major challenges 
to their rights from their deceased husband’s family upon his death. These include 
fights, threats and manipulation by father and brother-in-laws to get control of 
pensions, martyr payments from the government, and existing bank accounts as 
well as movable assets (businesses, cars) and immovable property (housing). In 
no cases were physical violence used, but more prominently were threats that the 
widows would lose custody rights to their children. Many women were also put 
under pressure to marry brothers-in-law (another ruse to keep deceased husbands 
assets in the extended family), though all refused. A common refrain among war 
widows was that the hardest thing they faced was lack of protection, especially 
mentioned by women who did not have a son of legal maturity.
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In these cases, the law as well as public opinion is with the widows and 
their children. For instance, one young widow consulted a religious leader who 
guaranteed her rights. The problem in these cases is social; widows do not want 
to bring shame on their children or the memory of their husband by going public 
(including to a court) with their problem. In addition, their children’s belonging 
in the kin framework of Gaza is to their deceased father’s family, if only in name. 
Thus, many widows prefer the long term security of good relations with their 
spouse’s family for the future of their children, rather than material rights for 
them in the present. The majority of war widows, two months following the loss 
of their spouse, had left their husband’s home if it belonged to their husband’s 
extended family (which is theirs by legal and cultural right) and moved in with 
their own parents. Only one women whose husband’s home was separate and 
owned (bought or built) outright by him, remained living in it after his death. 
None of the women considered opening a legal case against their in-laws.
Findings on Psycho-Social Needs and Access
My nine year old son has become out of control, he swears and lies 
and won’t listen to anyone.
Hanan, age 33, mother of five, home destroyed
My son whose in third grade is most effected…he has nightmares 
and sleepwalks and can’t stop remembering the war and what 
happened to us.
Samira, mother of five, home destroyed
My fourteen years old daughter witnessed the bombing and the 
killing of her father…she was turning over bodies in front of our 
door to see which was her father..In the beginning she wouldn’t 
drink or eat..My three year old wets herself – when she wants 
something she promises that she won’t wet herself…
Saida, age 46, widow, mother of twelve, Shuja’iyya
My youngest son is in kindergarten, he’s in a really difficult situation, 
I speak to him and he doesn’t reply, at the daycare he won’t play with 
the other kids or on the swings – he won’t interact with anyone.
Asma widow, age 26, mother of four
In contrast to the findings of the March 2009 UNIFEM survey, where it was 
found that men and women both saw themselves as suffering the most in terms 
of psychological effects of the war, two months later both seem to have shifted 
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their focus to the problems faced by their children – in particular their young 
children. Across Gaza, women and men both say the most affected groups are 
young children generally. The situation is said to be most acute among children 
who had lost an immediate family member as well as children living in front-
line areas. While respondents didn’t specify their ages when talking about young 
children it can be inferred from the material that they tend to be children from 
four to ten years of age. Men and women cited young children as the main family 
members suffering psychological effects from the war. However, the children cited 
as most critically suffering traumatic affects are those who have lost an immediate 
family member with many of them witnessing the event due to the nature of 
the war in which bombing did not distinguish between a battle area and civilian 
homes. Children of all ages who had lost a family member were cited as facing 
major problems. War widows were extremely concerned about their children’s 
psychological health. The other categories were children who had been in areas 
where bombing or fighting was focused – these included; Jabaliya; the eastern 
villages of Khan Younis, areas of Gaza City, as well as Beit Lahiya.
That they focused on the needs of their children does not mean that women 
were immune to their own situation – many women also answered that they 
themselves continued to very affected – and that they suffered sadness, anxiety, 
and continuous fear of “a second war”. 
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Honor Crimes and Audience reception: 
meaning Production and  
Gender interpretations
Benaz Somiry-Batrawi
Feminist media studies is a particularly dynamic field which 
has moved beyond earlier (although valuable) studies of media 
stereotyping to examine how audiences dynamically engage with 
media production. In this excerpt from her master’s thesis at the 
University of Leicester, Somiry-Batrawi examines Palestinian 
audience reception to a 2008 documentary film by Palestinian 
filmmaker Bouthaina Khoury. Her complete thesis also examines 
a early version of a dramatic fictional film produced by the 
Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counselling (now entitled 
Mina u Fina); her thesis in full is available from www.
arabwomanmedia.net. 
Introduction
Many civil society organizations in Palestine use television for the promotion 
of different concepts including democracy, justice, the rule of law, media, 
community development, and gender. This thesis aims at studying honor crimes 
presented in both drama and documentary film genres and the reception of 
television audiences: analysis of meaning construction and gender interpretations. 
It examines how audiences produce and interpret meanings, and whether or not 
interpretations are related to the audience’s gender. 
Honor crimes attract media attention on a national level, but the impact 
of media intervention has yet to be evaluated. Existing literature in the Arab 
region mainly focuses on textual analysis and not the relationship between the 
audience and the text. Therefore, this study will introduce new knowledge to the 
existing literature, provide women organizations and other relevant civil society 
bodies with a modest resource related to the impact of two educational films, and 
provide audience feedback on the impact of a drama film and a documentary, and 
assist in audience-text research projects.
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Feminism and Media Studies
The interest of academic feminism in studying TV and drama series in 
particular began in the mid seventies when feminists criticized drama content 
and its stereotype and emptiness. The three schools of feminism; liberal, radical 
and social agreed to consider media as the principal instrument to convey 
stereotypical, patriarchal and hegemonic values about women and femininity 
(Van Zoonen, 1996). This model is known as the Feminist Transmission Model 
of Communication. The common strategy for the three schools was to reflect 
the ideal world for women through media instead of reflecting the rejected 
reality. Good media served the feminism agenda, while bad media reinforced the 
status quo (Van Zoonen, 1996). As a result, feminists suggested the elimination 
of magazines, novels and soap operas from bad media, and replaced them with 
alternatives in good media. However, women continued to read and enjoy 
‘unfeminist’ genres. Moreover, the suggestion to remove unacceptable media 
meant that feminists or supporters would be denied the access to understand and 
explain developments. Criticism about this feminist transmission model brought 
about cultural feminist media studies. Feminist and cultural studies used the 
gender concept and looked at it within Stuart Hall’s (1980) encoding /decoding 
model. “The analysis of meaning production as cultural negotiation at the level of 
institutions, texts, and audiences builds on this model” (Van Zoonen, 1996:44). 
The concept of negotiated meaning and the stress on reception practices imply 
recognition for gender construction as a social process in which women and men 
are dynamically engaged. Furthermore, womanhood and manhood are both 
socially constructed where “audiences do not only take media as expressions of 
dominant culture, they also use media to express something about themselves, as 
women or as men,” (Van Zoonen, 1996:46) and this will be further elaborated 
in this study.
What is a “honor” crime?
The issue of honor crimes or ‘femicide’ as defined by Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 
(2004:21) “refers to any act of violence that gives girls or women the cause to 
for their lives under the banner of honor, being accused of conduct that implies 
engagement in a sexual behavior or act”. This concept as well, is derived from 
the voices of the victims and refers to “the status of entering a death zone that 
stretches on a range from the feeling by the victim -or her aid- that she is under 
the threat of being killed, to the loss of the victims’ life” (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 
2004:21). 
The phenomenon of honor crimes has worrying indicators in the Palestinian 
society. In 2007 only, approximately twenty six women in West Bank and Gaza 
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Strip were killed under the banner of honor crimes.1 “While between 2004 and 
2006, forty-eight women and girls were reported killed, the youngest was twelve 
years old and the oldest was eighty five. Police investigations documented thirty-
two cases of the forty-eight as ‘honor killings’, thirty victims were Moslems 
and two were Christians” (Palestinian NGOs against domestic violence against 
women, 2007:9 
As with any other Arab individual, a Palestinian individual does not live 
independently from social-cultural context. Marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
honor and other issues are collective matters that help to maintain or gain wealth 
and power. Therefore, there is a strong belief that an individual act of conduct 
can bring shame to the family, clan, tribe or the whole community. “Individuals 
have to conform to and promote the enforcement of social norms and honor 
codes that define what is considered to be honorable or dishonorable conduct” 
(Palestinian NGOs against Domestic violence against women, 2007:22). Men 
are expected to enforce such norms and traditions and protect family and male 
honor from shame. Women are expected to conduct themselves honorably. 
Producers of the two films, subject to research in this dissertation, encoded 
preferred readings in their texts in order to break the taboo of honor crimes 
(Khoury, 2008) and to stimulate families’ sympathy to act rationally when 
tackling honors issues (Odeh, 2008). Audiences in turn, would make sense of 
film texts by reading, decoding, and interpreting the embedded messages based 
on cross cutting factors as gender identity, level of education, age, locality, and 
occupation in the overall Palestinian social cultural context. 
Description of the Documentary Film “Maria’s Grotto”2
The 45-minute documentary film directly addresses three stories of honor killing 
in the Palestinian society with a fourth story as a historical background. The 
historical story is about Maria, a Christian female from the West Bank village of 
Al-Taybeh, who was shot dead by revolutionists in 1936 because she was wrongly 
suspected of having an affair with a shepherd from the same village. 
The second story is about Hiam, a 33-year old Moslem female, also from the 
Al-Taybeh village who, along with her unborn fetus, was poisoned and killed 
1 In 2009, according to the Independent Commission for Human Rights, the number of these 
killings was 9, five in Gaza and four in the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) – Editor’s note.
2 This film was produced and directed by Bothayna Khoury, an independent film maker, in 2008. 
Because of its sensitivity and critic, the film faced a considerable resistance by the community 
after the first public screen in Al Qasaba Theater in Ramallah city. Therefore, it was used in this 
study after long negotiations and after one scene was re-edited as a result of public pressure on 
the director. 
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by her brothers for carrying an illegitimate child. Her family accused Mahdi, a 
38-year-old married Christian, who was arrested for six months.  
The third story is about an anonymous female survivor from a village, who 
was stabbed seven times by her brother in reaction to rumors about her sexual 
conduct. The woman goes on to marry and have a son but discusses irreversible 
wounds to her body and soul. Her brother also explains his regrets and the 
pressure he was put under.
The fourth story is from Al-Lod, a Palestinian city inside Israel, where Abeer, a 
young female rapper in her twenties, is considered to behave inappropriately. Her 
extended family prohibits her from singing on stage with men, although her mom 
and sister support her. She abides by their demands, but does continue singing. 
The last scene of the film is dark and depressing. Most characters are shown to 
be leaving their villages and the singer is struggling to achieve her dream. 
Sampling and Focus Groups
A total of twenty-three men and women, all above 18-years old, was selected and 
formed into groups. Each group spent half a day viewing the film. Three viewing 
groups were constituted, varying not only in gender but also in terms of age, level 
of education, occupation, religion and locality. The variation was important to 
determine how different audiences make sense of what they are watching. 
After watching the film and filling in the questionnaire, the discussion and 
comments related to the film began quickly. Participants later were asked to offer 
interpretations for specific issues such as the main messages that the film tried to 
convey in general, the realism of the stories, and the emotional impact of watching 
the film.. The definition of ‘honor’, its connectedness to sexual behavior, and the 
wide-ranging sympathy with the three main characters in the documentary film 
was intriguing. Participants brought up relevant stories from their social contexts 
during the discussions which continued after the allotted time.
Maria’s Grotto: Meaning Construction  
and Gender Interpretations
The documentary film3 depicted four victims; Maria, Hiam, the Survivor who 
appeared in anonymity, and Abeer. All participants felt sorry about Maria’s murder, 
while most of them considered Hiam as an ideal victim, with the exception of two 
men who asserted that if she got pregnant out of marriage then she deserved to 
3 See above- film description
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die. “We have been raised this way; females are not like males who have the right to do 
anything. If she makes such a mistake, she should die” commented a man from Tubas 
village with a Bachelor’s degree. The same man insisted the Survivor “should also 
die” although the group agreed she was a victim. Abeer got the admiration and 
respect of all participants except for one participant in the men’s group who saw 
her importing cultural perceptions by singing rap songs. This man, who comes 
from Beit Reema village who holds a BA degree. strongly rejected Abeer’s choice 
“she judged her society by using foreign values and tools; she should not forget who 
she is”. Women participants sympathized and defended the victims while male 
participants investigated the causes of the violence or threats, and scaled victims 
in accordance to who deserves more compassion4 and why.
Victim Identification
Women’s opinions differed in the case of this film. One woman identified with 
all victims, a second identified with Abeer, and the third identified with none 
of the victims. In the mixed group one woman from Ramallah city who holds a 
Master’s degree said, “I could see myself in Abeer, there are dreams and ambitions 
that an individual wants to achieve but the society constrains her from achieving 
them”. Similarly 50% of the men identified with the victims, two men identified 
with all, two others with Abeer, one with the Survivor, and the remaining 50% 
could not identify with any. The man with an elementary school education from 
Beit Dajan village said “I could see myself with the Survivor, I imagined her being 
my sister, a man should seek the truth before doing anything, as our society is not 
merciful”. 
50% of the male participants could identify with the victims in the 
documentary film, while in the drama film none did. Literature stresses that men 
interact more with facts. The remaining 50% of the men still seem to find it 
difficult for their masculine identity to identify with any female victim and see 
the ‘honor victims’ as a woman’s issue.
Women identified with the victims but could not relate to any other characters 
in the film, while most men had different opinions. One man related to Mahdi, 
the suspected perpetrator. Two men related to the Survivor’s brother “I related 
to the Survivor’s brother because he tried to kill her to clean the shame, he did the 
right thing, and should not regret his act” said a resident of Tubas with a Bachelor’s 
degree from the men’s group. Two men related to Abeer, four related to no one. 
In the men’s group, a resident of Bir Zeit village with a Bachelor’s degree wrote, 
4 For gendered compassion please see Birgitta Hoijer (2004) The discourse of global compassion: 
the audience and media reporting of human suffering. Media, culture and society, (26) 4, pp513-
531. Retrieved March 14th,, 2008 from personal communication: Dr. Simon Cottle. 
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“I can’t relate because situations and people become different”, while two men wrote 
no answers. 
Compared to the WCLAC-produced drama film about 50% of the men 
could relate to some characters in documentary, while in the drama almost none 
did. No female participants related to any character in the documentary, but 
70% related to the drama. Every man in the 50% could relate to someone who 
is similar to his social and cultural context more deeply than to characters with 
similar ideological discourse and ethical conduct.
Sympathy
All women showed sympathy with all victims without specifying, while most 
men were more specific about their sympathy. A woman in the mixed group 
who holds a Master’s degree and lives in Ramallah said “I felt sympathy with 
every victim, in addition to Mahdi and his family”. Five men sympathized with all 
victims, one man specifically with Maria, another with Abeer, and a man in the 
mixed group from Beit Reema village said “I sympathize with Abeer ‘the rapper’ 
she has a different life vision than others, whereas the society interferes and limits the 
freedom of people”. While two sympathized with the Survivor, one did not feel any 
sympathy towards any of the victims and one man did not answer the question. 
It is clear that women empathized with all victims, regardless of the causes and 
motivations. Whereas 50% of men evaluate the victims based on a scale that 
differs from one case to another. Apparently men’s sympathy are conditional 
when comes to honor issue.
Opinions About Perpetrators
In the documentary, Mahdi, accused of adultery and fathering an illegitimate 
child – later proven innocent – was clearly shown on screen. The face of the 
Survivor’s brother was, upon his request, covered on screen. All male and female 
participants except two, concluded that Mahdi was unfairly treated. He had 
been assumed guilty and his house and business were burnt to the ground. Two 
men saw him guilty to some extent, “I think he had to do something with Hiam, 
otherwise would not be a suspect”, said a participant with a Bachelor’s degree in the 
men’s group from Birzeit village. Another participant, a Master’s degree student 
from Beit Reema village, in the same group commented, “He deserved what he 
got, when tribal law proved his innocence and the paternity test showed no relation to 
Hiam’s pregnancy, he should have asked for compensation from her family”. 
The Survivor’s brother, who used to beat her aggressively when hearing any 
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rumors about her sexual conduct, ended by stabbing her seven times. Women 
and men almost agreed that he should have sought the truth before beating her. 
Women condemned his behavior with no excuses. One woman in the mixed 
group who is from Gaza and holds a Bachelor’s degree said “After hearing his 
regret, I do not give him any excuse, but I can imagine all the pressure and internal 
emotions that he went through”. Most male participants tried to justify his angry 
behavior by blaming the pressure that came from his community when rumors 
spread about his sister. “In the beginning when hearing about beating his sister I 
hated him, but when I heard his remorse, I felt sympathy with him because he was self 
critical” said one man in the mixed group from Azmout village with a Master’s 
degree. Women did not, and could not find excuses for abusers, while men were 
searching for reasons to “protect themselves against the myth of violence as 
specific male characteristics” (Hoijer, 2004:526).
Personal Experiences
Women showed no personal experience, the woman from Gaza city said “No, 
thank God, I do not have any”. Three men out of eleven said they had a personal 
experience, the man with an elementary school education said “my female neighbor 
was accused of having a relationship on the phone, but it turned to be just rumors, a 
man should not rush before doing any act”. One man said that he once was asked 
for an advice from woman who was harassed. A man from Azmout talked about 
standing up for his beliefs “The community in my village was very conservative ten 
years ago, and I was a communist, people did not accept me and tried to harass my 
father when going to pray in the mosque”. 
Most Effective Scenes
Several scenes affected the participants. One woman was affected by all the scenes, 
another woman from Ramallah city with a Master’s degree talked about “the 
fetus that was dropped from the equation with no fault”. Three men spoke about 
the anonymity of Hiam and her fetus, two spoke of Mahdi’s mother-frantically 
searching for her son in prisons while knowing his home was burnt down, two 
spoke of tribal reconciliation, one spoke of the Survivor discussing her trauma. 
One man was affected by all scenes, one was mostly affected when Mahdi’s family 
left emigrated, and one was affected when the Survivor said that no one listened 
to her complaints. In the mixed group, a man wrote, “I was mostly affected by the 
collective pain”. In regards to the effective scenes, men were more moved than 
women as the scenes touched multi dimensions of their lives. 
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Conflict Resolutions
Mahdi emigrated to avoid the negative attitude of his community. The Survivor, 
who went on to marry and give birth, also relocated. Abeer decided to continue 
rapping despite her community’s rejection and threats. Two women accepted 
Mahdi and the Survivor’s resolution of the conflict. One of these women said “If 
it happened to me, I couldn’t face the community, I would take the easiest solution 
by leaving and not confronting the community on a daily basis.” Three men did 
not agree with Mahdi’s solution. One man said, “when a person walks in the right 
direction, and does not do anything wrong from his point of view, I see here traditions 
and habits are not essentials”. Another man said, “I would neither surrender by 
killing nor challenge the society by staying, if it happened to my sister, I would take 
her immediately and leave to another place where I could live anonymously.” The rest 
saw Mahdi and the Survivor’s solutions as predictable and acceptable under the 
society’s pressure.
All men complemented Abeer’s decision to challenge her community, but two 
questioned her negotiating tool and said that she should have used other acceptable 
tools to confront negative phenomena in her society. A man in the mixed said “she 
can use another tool like a documentary film in order to convey her message, we should 
understand the society we are living in. There is not only one tool to reach people”. 
Regardless of their gender, participants viewed solutions from within their social-
cultural perspectives and their abilities to confront the society. Most men and two 
women referred peoples’ behaviors and attitudes to the pressure of society and the 
deeply-rooted traditions but not religion, taking into consideration the double 
burden on women rather than on the privileged men.
Honor as a Moral Category
In the Palestinian social and cultural context, “the notion of ‘honor’ is viewed as a 
collective rather than an individual concern, which makes preserving or cleansing 
it from shame a responsibility of the community as manifested in social pressure” 
(Palestinian NGOS against domestic violence against women, 2007: 45). Again, 
women define honor as a matter of high values and decent conduct. In the 
Palestinian society ‘honor’ is mainly linked to sexual behavior which women find 
it unacceptable. The participant from Gaza summarized her opinion by saying 
“Looking at ‘honor’ only as a sexual behavior is a symbol of backwardness”. The 
majority of men participants related ‘honor’ to values and conduct and connected 
it to loyalty for home. “For me ‘honor’ means not to be a collaborator with Israel, 
or not to be corrupt. ‘Honor’ means a lot more than sexual connotations” explained 
a male participant from Al-Bireh city with a Master’s degree. Two men, who are 
originally from villages in the north of the West Bank, connected honor to sexual 
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conduct. A man with a Bachelor’s degree residing in Toubas village said, “This is 
how I was raised, even though I have been living in the city for ten years now, when I 
go to my home village, I act like them and be one of them”. The man from Beit Dajan 
with an elementary school education said, “to be called, a collaborator with Israel, 
or a thief, is considered easier than being called a whore, this is honor, not a game”. 
Opinions Re-Assessment
None of the women had reassessed her opinion, while three men had changed 
their minds regarding specific points. The male Master’s degree student from Beit 
Reema village,studying for his Master’s degree changed his view, “After watching 
the two films, I changed my mind, if the extended family one day decided to kill one of 
its females, I will stand against them, they cannot do so”. The man from Al-Jalazoun 
camp also reconsidered his view “ Considering all the discussion, I am now very sure 
that honor killing is not a solution, on the contrary the community will always remember 
the issue and shame will stay with children and grandchildren”. The man from Al-
Bireh said, “I found that we still have long way to go in order to bury the honor killing 
phenomenon, a third party has to intervene”. Women already have a background 
and formed opinions and felt they did not need to reassess their views, while some 
men were informed by the discussion and commented immediately on how the 
discussion affected their views. 
It was clear that documentary film raised a heated discussion among participants 
creating varied and contradicting meanings, and consequently different decoding 
positions. Audiences expressed the reason behind it, as characters were real as well 
as the stories, and they felt the characters living among them.
Major Differences among Male and Female Interpretations 
As stated earlier in this study, determinant factors in meaning construction and 
messages decoding are gender, locality, academic background and the social-cultural 
context. Discussions in the focus groups revealed a high degree of consensus about 
the main meanings of images and narratives, and showed the level of cleverness 
people bring to the readings of such representations.. Janice Radway, 1984-1987 
concluded that women practice an act of protest in the patriarchal culture when 
reading romance, this study shows that women practice an act of protesting when 
constructing meanings and interpreting honor crimes texts that are against the 
mainstream culture. Consequently, regardless of determinant factors, women were 
against femicide under any circumstances, while men were more yielding. Some 
women equally condemned both individuals involved in an illegitimate sexual 
relationship, while two men asserted that only females should be condemned.
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Despite their understanding of the right for life, the majority of men, except 
for three, asserted loudly that they could not defend it when a woman’s sexual 
conduct is brought to question. Because honor is a collective matter, if the clan 
gathers and decides to kill a female for disgracing the family’s honor, no one 
can question their decision. “I cannot do anything to stop it if she is an adulteress, 
I am from a village, the traditions and norms dominate our acts and if a female 
does it, she should be killed”, the man from Tubas village said. Men and women, 
except two men, sympathized with the victims in both genres, but the degree 
differed from one victim to another. Men’s sympathy was related to the extent 
of victim’s misconduct. Men were mostly affected by documentary genre, while 
most women felt both had the same effectiveness. Three women revealed personal 
experiences after watching the drama while three men talked about personal 
experiences after watching the documentary. Men and women differed in their 
opinions on conflict resolution/narrative, but agreed that social pressure is the 
culprit. All participants, except two men, connected ‘honor’ to decent conduct, 
good morals, honesty and nationalism. 
In conclusion, religious and civic law are not the only determinant factors 
when it comes to meaning construction, interpretations and message decoding of 
honor crimes, but audience bring other resources to bear on their interpretations 
and discourse such as traditions, norms, and social order that are considered the 
most determinant factors in this process. Not one man in the discussions stated 
that women should not be judged, have the absolute right to own and control 
their bodies, and the right to live without the fear of death as punishment.
Messages Decoding - Ideological Questioning and Opposition 
Gathered data show a high degree of consensus about the fundamental messages 
of the two films; fighting violence against women (Khoury, 2008) and raising 
awareness about the right for life (Odeh, 2008). Most people tend to show 
considerable skill and a shared cultural understanding in interpreting multifaceted 
messages conveyed by the style of genre (Kitzinger, 2004:178). Although messages 
may be read in the same way, the decoding term may differ when a reader takes a 
position. One man expressed denial when watching the incest scene in the drama 
film by saying, “the case is extreme, the director is exaggerating, incest does not happen 
often in the Palestinian society”. In the case of Hiam and her unborn child, two 
men understood the right to life on cognitive level, but opposed it ideologically 
(Hoijer, 1998) saying that she deserved to die for getting illegitimately pregnant. 
All participants agreed that honor crimes are a complex issue, and solutions such 
as public awareness campaigns and parenting courses should be introduced to 
stop such crimes. 
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